

## 7. Philosophy of Mind Becomes Aesthetics: Cavell and Dialectics

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Philosophy concerns those necessities we cannot, being human, fail to know. Except that nothing is more human than to deny them.

CAVELL, *Must We Meant What We Say?*

That human (op)positions, contradiction and conflict, permeate our world is obvious; however, if, we (human beings) share a conceptual scheme, common to us all, how then we can agree and disagree, accept and reject, admit or repress, recognize and misrecognize so much in our worlds—between others and ourselves—is not obvious, or needs to be recounted. Notwithstanding, we want to reconsider our shared conceptual scheme—the necessities apart from which we cannot say what we ordinarily say, or even do. To be sure, the (op)positions result from these necessities. It is that sort of necessity, so to say, *logic*, or “what is common to us all,” that “we” want to describe, figure out or find out in ordinary language. To acknowledge a Cavellian insinuation: the necessities, being human, we must affirm and deny at once (i.e. the sense I sketch out from the epigraph above). In this essay, I claim that *that* is a dialectic inherent in ordinary language (in human forms of life).

If we reflect upon, stop to recollect and recognize, what is, and, how it is that we ever agree or disagree about what we ordinarily say, should say about anything, e.g. how we can say that is “human” or “inhuman” or “monstrous”; as it were, whether there is a criterion of humanity, we then realize how hard it is to begin at the beginning. If we were to acknowledge that the oppositions, the differences in schemes of concepts, in the real world are necessities, and contingencies (or conventionalities), we then acknowledge the unacknowledged other (how there are, or could be, different conceptual

schemes, categories or criteria, at all). The oppositions, or call it, antitheses or antagonisms, are the means by which the world, others, or ourselves (even the human) can alter. That is change. I shall further suggest that these oppositions (necessities) are “a production of dialectic,” which result from speaking “outside language games,” as it were, needing a suturing of the splits.<sup>1</sup> The need is to bring ourselves back into language—the human nature itself—and natural forms of life. The problem is that going outside language, or forms of life, is a rejection of the human, but nothing could be more human.

Since, there have been different conceptions of dialectics, I begin by broaching dialectics (the view I advance); next I explain three themes, or formulations, from “Aesthetic Problems in Modern Philosophy” to illuminate *The Claim of Reason’s* parenthetical remark, “Thus may the philosophy of mind become aesthetics,” in order to better understand how we (the human being) can, and do, change.<sup>2</sup> In the “Preface to Updated Edition” of *Must We Mean What We Say?*, Cavell registers three formulations, or descriptions, that recur in his thoughts, that he recognizes as his manner, i.e. he says, “to introduce a remark in guise (calling attention to itself) means to mark an intuition I find guiding, or whose obscurity or incompleteness is meant to be undisguised, intended to remind myself in public, that I find significance here that I have not earned, to which accordingly I know I owe return.”<sup>3</sup> Hence, what follows is an attempt, a return to un-disguise the guise of Cavell’s remarks, as it were, to remember philosophy’s leading us away from only to bring us back into human language and life.

### **Cavell’s Wittgenstein: Philosophizing as “A Criticism of Itself”**

I want to further say somethings about the space in which, and how Cavell’s Wittgenstein philosophizes, and why it is not merely dialogical (but relentlessly dialecti-

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1. Cavell, *The Claim of Reason: Wittgenstein, Skepticism, Morality, and Tragedy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979), 224.

2. *Ibid.*, 357.

3. Cavell, *Must We Meant What We Say?*, xxiv.

cal).<sup>4</sup> To be sure, philosophy is not other than conversation, but because it is, it necessarily involves different interlocutor's, or speakers, thus there are differences of perspective, experience, about what we should say. Hence, I call it, *dialectics*.<sup>5</sup> That's the starting point. Now, in "Aesthetic Problems of Modern Philosophy," Cavell exemplifies that philosophizing is: "a process of bringing ourselves back into our natural forms of life, putting our souls back into our bodies, [like describing] the accommodation of the new music as one of naturalizing ourselves to a new form of life, a new world."<sup>6</sup> The examples are that of having lost ourselves then finding a way back home—a return to our nature, life, body, or appreciating new music. Unquestionably, these are dialectical. But the question is why a return to Hegel? And further, why would one ever go outside oneself, one's natural form of life, in the first place? What would, or could, be the motive?

To be sure, the "way philosophical problems end" in Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations* is close to Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit*. For this reason, Cavell makes it explicit, "I can think of no closer title for it [Wittgenstein's mode of criticism], in an established philosophical vocabulary, than Hegel's use of the term *Aufhebung*," the suggested translation of the term is "to sublimate," he continues, "It seems to me to capture the sense of satisfaction in our representation of rival positions," as it were, "canceling" each other out. In this kind of philosophical criticism, however, Cavell claims "it is pointless for one side to refute the other" because "its cause and topic is the self getting in its own way."<sup>7</sup> So, the (op)positions, antithesis, or antagonisms are within ourselves.<sup>8</sup>

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4. That is why, Wittgenstein says (I doubt Cavell knew this saying), "The dialectical method is very sound and a way in which we do work. But it should not try to find, from two propositions, a. and b. a further more complex proposition, as Broad's description implied. [The end...] should be to find out where the ambiguities in our language are," Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Wittgenstein's Lectures, Cambridge 1932-1935: From the Notes of Alice Ambrose and Margaret Macdonald*, ed. Alice Ambrose (Oxford: Basil Blackwell), 74. See Alexander Berg, "Identity in Difference—Wittgenstein's Hegel," in *Wittgenstein and Hegel: Reevaluation of Difference* (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2019), 356-359, study of the extent of Wittgenstein's understanding of Broad's Hegelian lectures.

5. Paul Feyerabend, *Against Method* (London: Verso, 2010), 11, recommends Hegel's "dialectical thinking" for progress in everyday language and life (including philosophy of science).

6. Cavell, *Must We Mean What We Say?*, 78.

7. *Ibid.*, 79.

8. Hegel remarks, "This dialectical movement which consciousness practices in its own self (as well as in its knowing and in its object), insofar as, for consciousness, the new, true object arises out of this movement, is properly what is called experience," *Phenomenology of Spirit* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), §86. Stephen Houlgate explains Hegel's argument to be understood in this manner, "I cannot revert to that initial conception of the object, however, because in the alteration of my knowledge that has *already taken place* the object itself has been altered in my eyes the object has proven

Indeed, Wittgenstein's aim is dialectical resolution. It is crucial not only to return to Hegel, but Fichte, who registers that the dialectic is not a mere thesis-antithesis-synthesis method, but rather concern the double negation, a negation of negation (I explain this in the third formulation, "nothing more human than to deny them"). Is it right that Wittgenstein's dialogues have to do with "the self getting in its own way"?<sup>9</sup> I think so. In *The Claim of Reason*, Cavell's Wittgenstein, represents a relentless self-questioning, reproducing antitheses and antagonisms. What Cavell rightly calls, "a criticism of itself."<sup>10</sup> To better understand this negation of negation, take Wittgenstein's aphorism: "What is your aim in philosophy?—To show the fly the way out of the fly-bottle."<sup>11</sup> Hence, apparently suggesting a redundancy, "Why did it get into the bottle in the first place?" (first negation)—"Well, to learn to get out of course" (second negation).

The dialectic inherent in *The Claim of Reason*, emerges in distinguishing between Wittgensteinian/everyday criteria, which I claim in the end is cancelled out. First, to repeat Cavell's Wittgenstein offers Hegel's *Aufhebung*, a sort of resolution, for philosophy's end.<sup>12</sup> Second, Cavell's Wittgenstein summons or calls for a Wittgensteinian/everyday criteria distinction, which results in the sublation of itself. Therefore, Cavell parenthetically registers, "the bulk of Wittgenstein's rhetoric in manipulating the term "criterion" is just the rhetoric of the ordinary word."<sup>13</sup> Again, offering further description of Wittgensteinian criteria, Cavell recounts, "this turns out to be just the ordinary rhetorical structure of the ordinary word 'criterion'."<sup>14</sup> To remember Wittgenstein's dialogues in *Philosophical Investigations* have the form of,

When philosophers use a word—"knowledge," "being," "object," "I," "proposition/sentence," "name"—and try to grasp the essence of the thing, one must

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not just to be X, but to be Y." See Stephen Houlgate, *Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit: A Readers Guide* (London: Bloomsbury, 2013), 19.

9. Cavell, *Must We Meant What We Say?*, 79.

10. Cavell, *The Claim of Reason*, 3.

11. Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, 4th edn. (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley-Blackwell), §309. But why did it get into the bottle in the first place? (Well then, what is it like to be a fly?) So the analogy breaks down. But I am tempted to say, the fly was curious, wanted to see the inside of the bottle, was looking for food, got lost, accidentally, and so on. In going inside and outside of the bottle, the fly learned it was free to go in-and-out of it. It was not just a matter of knowing it, but rather how to do it. Or, it does so, just because.

12. Cavell, *Must We Meant What We Say?*, 79.

13. Cavell, *The Claim of Reason*, 7.

14. *Ibid.*, 8.

always ask oneself: is the word ever actually used in this way in the language in which it is at home?<sup>15</sup>

The dialogues have this movement from what philosopher's say we should say to what ordinarily we say we say. So, we can insert into the question the word "criterion" —for the terms in which we say what we say—about its use in ordinary language. Further to the point, Wittgenstein's slogan is, "What we do is to bring words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use."<sup>16</sup> This is what we want to do with the term "criterion," ultimately, to bring it home.

Additionally, Cavell registers that Part Four of *The Claim of Reason*, consciously or self-consciously, philosophizes "within the means of a tradition of philosophy that has thought to sidestep Fichte and Hegel [...] and speaking for myself, finds no help in Heidegger's *Mitsein* (being with others)."<sup>17</sup> In interpretations of Cavell within the space of the so called Analytic/Continental split, his thoughts are usually returned to Austin and Wittgenstein, or, Heidegger and Levinas; but rarely to Fichte and Hegel; I am inclined to say, this calls for bringing the human animal back into philosophy. Even as, philosophy in the English-speaking world, has for some time maintained a split between the Analytic and the Continental (or Post-Kantian) traditions, what could Cavell's rediscovery, and say, return to Fichte and Hegel, amount to? What philosophical, political or aesthetic ramifications arise?

Finally, dialectics takes to heart, putting into practice, a mutual questioning between ourselves and the other, namely, modern culture(s). I appropriate Austin's invitation to "linguistic phenomenology," which is the practice of imagining "a situation *slightly* differently," to "discipline our wretched imaginations," about "what we should say": only to find that "sometimes we do ultimately disagree" or "sometimes we allow a usage, though appalling, yet actual" or use "two different descriptions," but we want to find "*why* we disagree—you choose to classify in one way, I in another." But I most embrace Austin's remark, "a genuine loose or eccentric talker is a rare specimen to be prized."<sup>18</sup> Like Wittgenstein, Austin is fully dialectical. This

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15. Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, §116.

16. *Ibid.*

17. Cavell, *Philosophy the Day After Tomorrow* (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press, 2006), 149.

18. J. L. Austin, *Philosophical Papers* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979), 182, 184.

kind of self-understanding goes back-and-forth between the other and ourselves, and fundamentally, it is a questioning, in Cavell's words, of culture's criteria, and our words and life:

Then I may feel that my foregone conclusions were never conclusions / had arrived at, but were merely imbibed by me, merely conventional. I may blunt that realization through hypocrisy or cynicism or bullying. But I may take the occasion to throw myself back upon my culture, and ask why we do what we do, judge as we judge, how we have arrived at these crossroads. What is the natural ground of our conventions, to what are they in service? It is inconvenient to question a convention; that makes it unserviceable, it no longer allows me to proceed as a matter of course; the paths of action, the paths of words, are blocked. "To imagine a language means to imagine a form of life" (cf. §19). In philosophizing, I have to bring my own language and life into imagination. What I require is a convening of my culture's criteria, in order to confront them with my words and life as I pursue them and as I may imagine them; and at the same time to confront my words and life as I pursue them with the life my culture's words may imagine for me: to confront the culture with itself, along the lines in which it meets in me.

This seems to me a task that warrants the name of philosophy.<sup>19</sup>

Hence, I read Cavell's text to imply that, if the task of philosophy is a confrontation between our culture's criteria and our words and life, to confront culture with itself; then I must ask just what are these criteria and words, these lives, which meet in me; what are they for, what do they do? Why do I (or we) feel they are necessities? What I show, therefore, in the next three Cavellian themes is that dialectic is inherent in ordinary language, its criteria, and how they reveal mutual recognition (or acknowledgement) and misrecognition between others and ourselves. So, to begin at the beginning.

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19. Cavell, *The Claim of Reason*, 125.

## Undoing the Psychologizing of Psychology

In Cavell's "Aesthetic Problems," the first formulation, or description of Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations*' concern with ordinary language—what we say when—is a suggestion about the significance of our response to the sense in which we accept or agree in—or even why we disagree about—our saying, claiming, judging, deciding: "it attempts to undo the psychologizing of psychology, to show the necessity controlling our application of psychological and behavioral categories; even, one could say, show the necessities in human action and passion themselves."<sup>20</sup> To be clear, Cavell's Wittgenstein appears to work in the philosophy of mind, attempting to think about what "grammar" does, how and what it reveals about knowing other minds and knowing one's own mind. But is that what Wittgensteinian grammar are for?

It is significant that in the above essay, what is in question in Cavell's conversation with Wittgenstein concerns knowing other minds or knowing our own mind. But that significance is not because the concern is to know whether we know (the *existence* of) other minds or our own mind, but how we know (the *identification* of) what knowing anything is. To be more precise, the conversations are attempts at finding out or figuring out differences between aesthetic judgment and a philosophical claim, i.e. the ways of identifying by discrimination, upon which we agree or disagree about what we say we should say, e.g. what we say we know. But what how do we describe that, what do we call these considerations, this sort of conversation? There is a temptation by some to call it, *psychology* because it is obviously not logic; but to others (Cavell included), the temptation is to call it *logic* because it is obviously not psychology (though he does not "really think it is either of those"). Those wanting to call these differences logical, Cavell thinks are, "responding to a sense of necessity we feel in them, together with a sense that necessity is, partly, a matter of the ways a judgment is supported, the ways in which conviction in it is produced."<sup>21</sup> Whatever the differences in judgments about anything, their importance is they are the terms the in which, or, the means by which we identify something or someone, recognize

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20. Cavell, *Must We Meant What We Say?*, 84-85.

21. *Ibid.*, 87.

(or misrecognize) things. What are some examples of the support for our judgments, and why are they necessary: “it is by virtue of these recurrent patterns of support that a remark will count as—will be—aesthetic, or a mere matter of taste, or a moral, propagandistic, religious, magical, scientific, philosophical.”<sup>22</sup> These differences are necessary, just because apart from them we cannot say what we should say—what *counts as* a remark—for short, we could not decide or judge or determine anything without them.

Although, Cavell is arguing for the significance of Wittgensteinian grammar, and he takes up the problem here; however, the idea of Wittgensteinian criteria is not brought up until “Knowing and Acknowledging” and developed until *The Claim of Reason*. It is not fully clear what these are. What are they for? What can they not do

What Wittgensteinian criteria are not: Those who defend and attack Wittgenstein, have taken Wittgensteinian criteria to be “the means by which the existence of something is established with certainty.”<sup>23</sup> Cavell calls this the, Malcolm-Albritton view, which responds to skepticism by refuting, or “showing it to be false.” But Cavell’s view is that “criteria cannot do this and [...] are not meant to [...] On the contrary, the fate of criteria, or their limitation, reveals [...] the truth of skepticism.”<sup>24</sup> First, Wittgensteinian criteria and grammar do *not* establish the existence of anything. Second, Cavell’s Wittgenstein does *not* refute skepticism. What is shown is rather the truth of skepticism. But what that is, I return to below.

Now, in Cavell’s view I have mentioned there is a distinction between Wittgensteinian criteria and everyday criteria. But how are they distinct? While not precisely the same idea the former is dependent upon the latter. Next, the idea of Wittgensteinian criteria, is characterized in several remarks, “Grammar tells what kind of object anything is”;<sup>25</sup> “Essence is expressed by grammar”;<sup>26</sup> “An ‘inner process’ stands in need of outward criteria.”<sup>27</sup> What is crucial about Wittgensteinian criteria, to answer a previous question, they are “necessary before the identification or knowledge of an object,”<sup>28</sup> without which we cannot distinguish anything. Sometimes Witt-

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22. Ibid.

23. Cavell, *The Claim of Reason*, 6.

24. Ibid., 7.

25. Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, §373.

26. Ibid., §371.

27. Ibid., §580.

28. Cavell, *The Claim of Reason*, 17.



Wittgenstein calls them “conventions; sometimes rules.”<sup>29</sup> I shall try to explain this. In reconsidering ostensive definition, in a Wittgensteinian case, for describing the grammar, namely, the use or meaning of a word by pointing to an object, saying what it is called, or named, what is necessary for that sort of definition is: “One has already to know (or be able to do) something before one can ask what something is called. But what does one have to know?”<sup>30</sup> In the Wittgensteinian case, asking my one-year-old daughter, for the first time—“What is your name?”—she responds to my surprise, rightly—“Izel” pointing to herself—but then, and what I am surprised by, she must know grammar, i.e. what a name is, or what *calling*, or *pointing* to is for, and prior to our questions-and-answers (and, there are the cases of her learning concepts—number or color or sound or taste or shape or size, and so on); I asked my two-year-old son—“Who are you?”—he responds—“Levi is Levi!”—does he already have a whole descriptive metaphysics? But where did that identity with itself, or call it tautology, come from?

I want to describe the idea of everyday criteria a little more: Cavell offers seven elements that function in them: (1) Source of authority; (2) Authority's mode of acceptance; (3) Epistemic goal; (4) Candidate object or phenomenon; (5) Status concept; (6) Epistemic means (specification of criteria); (7) Degree of satisfaction (standards or tests for applying (6)). Since, Wittgensteinian criteria are based on our everyday criteria, but not quite the same, Cavell explains three disanalogies between them. In the first disanalogy, in Wittgensteinian cases of (6) Epistemic means, or the application of criteria, do not appeal to (7) Degree of satisfaction or the application of standards. These cases are somehow Cavell notes “non-standard.” (CR: 13). Here, Espen Hammer explains, “criteria allow one to determine whether an object is of a specific kind, the application of standards tells the *degree* to which that object satisfies those criteria.”<sup>31</sup> In deciding whether that is a good, or great, cup of coffee, the critic, or judge of a barista competition needs criteria (epistemic means) to determine their kind of drink—espresso, macchiato, cortado, cappuccino, and so on; but the judge also needs to decide the degree (standards) to which the drink is made, refined, or

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29. *Ibid.*, 30.

30. Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, §30.

31. Espen Hammer, *Stanley Cavell: Skepticism, Subjectivity, and the Ordinary* (Cambridge: Polity Books, 2002), 33.

perfected; and the overall experience, as well as, presentation of the drink, provided for the coffee consumer. But in Wittgensteinian criteria “standards play no role.”<sup>32</sup> In the second disanalogy, that concern (4) Candidate object, or phenomenon, and (5) Status concept, these go together in everyday criteria, but do not in Wittgensteinian cases. So, Cavell states, “Wittgenstein's candidates for judgment are not of this kind; they neither raise nor permit an obvious question of evaluation or competitive status.”<sup>33</sup> In short, Hammer comments that Wittgensteinian criteria differ from everyday criteria, in that evaluation and evidence in the former as opposed to the latter “with regard to these objects make no sense.”<sup>34</sup> The third disanalogy, concerns the (1) Source of authority in Wittgensteinian and everyday criteria. The problem is that while the source of authority may vary in everyday criteria; “Wittgenstein’s source of authority never varies.” Cavell argues “It is, for [Wittgenstein], always we who “establish” the criteria under investigation.”<sup>35</sup> In short, the description of criteria turns out to be a description of ourselves (here we may begin to feel the threat of skepticism). This brings us, naturally, to the following section.

### **Ordinary Language Philosophy Is About Whatever Ordinary Language Is About**

In “Aesthetic Problems,” the second formulation, in the subtitle above, is preceded by Cavell’s saying, “that the philosophy of ordinary language is not about language, anyway not in any sense in which it is not also about the world.”<sup>36</sup> Briefly, ordinary language is about the ordinary world. So that what we philosophize about is the ordinary. As Cavell earlier, registered, this conception of philosophy allows us to reason about anything within our experience, anything about which we are interested. The *Überhaupt* concern, I am suggesting, is the sense in which we say what we should say, i.e., the criteria, or logic (necessity) of ordinary language. To repeat, for Wittgensteinian criteria there is a single source of authority, namely, “the speaker of a language, the

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32. *Ibid.*, 33.

33. Cavell, *The Claim of Reason*, 14.

34. Hammer, *Stanley Cavell*, 34.

35. Cavell, *The Claim of Reason*, 18.

36. Cavell, *Must We Meant What We Say?*, 89.

human group as such.”<sup>37</sup> This then entails naturally the possibility, even necessity, of differences in language, and differences in differences, between human groups; but maybe that entailment is not obvious; further I may be wrong, but the obvious question is: Doesn’t that entail the undoing of *the criterion of the human* as such?

In *Philosophical Investigations* §241, as I read Wittgenstein’s description of the concept, or criteria of judgment, in exemplifying the eliciting of our grammar; it is always already a matter of describing the terms in which or with which we accept or agree about anything. Wittgenstein’s interlocutor asks, “So you are saying that human agreement decides what is true and what is false?” Wittgenstein replies, “What is true or false is what human beings say; and it is in their language that human beings agree. This is agreement not in opinions, but rather in form of life.” To elucidate Stephen Mulhall states, “the agreement about which Wittgenstein is talking (his term *uberinstimmung*) is agreement in something rather than agreement to something, he is interested in the fact that human beings agree in definition and judgments.”<sup>38</sup> That means we accept or reject conceptual schemes. Moreover, Mulhall explains, the Wittgensteinian criterion presupposes “that ordinary language is shared and pervasively systematic [...] drawing upon a background of agreements.”<sup>39</sup> In surveying our criteria we find the necessity of (or need for) our agreements in definitions and judgments—in human forms of life—so Cavell says: “There are two general or background claims about what we say which Wittgenstein summarizes with the idea of grammar: that [ordinary] language is shared, that the forms I rely upon in making sense are human forms, that they impose human limits upon me, that when I say what we “can” and “cannot” say I am indeed voicing necessities which others recognize, i.e., obey (consciously or not); and that our uses of language are pervasively, almost unimaginably, systematic.”<sup>40</sup>

Again, Cavell explains, that Wittgenstein’s eliciting of our criteria, “call[s] to consciousness the astonishing fact of the astonishing extent to which we do agree in judgment [...] to show therefore that our judgments are public, that is, shared.”<sup>41</sup> So that is what Wittgensteinian criteria *do*, namely, reveal how we agree in judgments.

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37. Hammer, *Stanley Cavell*, 35.

38. Stephen Mulhall, *Stanley Cavell: Philosophy’s Recounting of the Ordinary* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 81.

39. *Ibid.*, 81.

40. Cavell, *The Claim of Reason*, 29.

41. *Ibid.*, 31.

In answer also to the question of what motivates this philosophizing, and what makes it astonishing:

[there is the appearance that] the extent of agreement is so intimate and pervasive; that we communicate in language as rapidly and completely as we do; and that since we cannot assume that the words we are given have their meaning by nature, we are led to assume they take it from convention; and yet no current idea of “convention” could seem to do the work that words do — there would have to be, we could say, too many conventions in play, one for each shade of each word in each context.<sup>42</sup>

The even more astonishing remark is, “We cannot have agreed beforehand to all that would be necessary.”<sup>43</sup> Without agreements in the terms of conversations, or conventions, we could never have, hold, or get on with it (Wittgenstein’s “That’s why ‘Following a rule’ is practice”).<sup>44</sup> But that is what we want out of philosophy, namely, a priori necessity, the order prior to our language (as if, to think a rule were to follow it, as if, to follow it privately).<sup>45</sup>

What Wittgensteinian criteria do not do, I am persuaded, in the case of someone or other’s being in pain, is to establish the *existence* of something with certainty. Wittgensteinian criteria give us the *identity* of something with certainty (I said this in the previous section):

Criteria are “criteria for something’s being so,” not in the sense that they tell us of a thing’s existence, but of something like its identity, not of its *being* so, but of its being *so*. Criteria do not determine the certainty of statements, but the application of the concepts employed in statements.<sup>46</sup>

Hence, criteria do not determine or decide whether anything is, but what anything is —like human conventions, or rules for playing a language-game. But doesn’t this, ne-

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42. Ibid.

43. Ibid.

44. Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, §202.

45. Ibid.

46. Cavell, *The Claim of Reason*, 45.

cessarily, mean that I can or cannot deny our criteria? In order to say what we say, I cannot deny our criteria, however, to say what we should say, I can deny them. I really want to say: *I must*.

On the truth of skepticism: What Cavell means by Wittgenstein's response to skepticism is "that the skeptic's denial of our criteria is a denial to which criteria must be open."<sup>47</sup> But how, and why is that an opening of criteria? Cavell explains, "If the fact that we share, or have established, criteria is the condition under which we can think and communicate in language," and this is the unease about our agreeing not merely in definitions but rather in judgments, "then skepticism is a natural possibility of that condition; it reveals most perfectly the standing threat to thought and communication, that they are only human, nothing more than natural to us."<sup>48</sup> As I understand Wittgensteinian criteria, and Cavell's view, it is their shared purpose or aim to get the reader to grasp our shared nature—our shared criteria and conventions—the conventionality of the "human"—the undoing of the criterion of humanity. I will say more about the natural and denial of the human below.

Moreover, Cavell thinks, "the philosopher appealing to everyday language turns to the reader not to convince him without proof but to get him to prove something test something, against himself."<sup>49</sup> Here the impersonal becomes personal. "He is saying; Look and find out whether you can see what I see, wish to say what I wish to say," what this is explaining is, "all the philosopher, this kind of philosopher, can do is to express, as fully as he can, his world, and attract our undivided attention to our own."<sup>50</sup> That's also why expression, or acknowledgement, as acceptance or admission, even confession is crucial to knowing, or better put, understanding ourselves and others.

In *The Claim of Reason*, Cavell reformulates his remarks about what Wittgensteinian criteria, or grammar, can do—what we must say, or do. Again, Wittgensteinian criteria do not yield "certainty about existence" but rather "tell how things count for us," e.g. what we take to be something, something as something, how we say or do anything.<sup>51</sup> For this reason, Cavell records in some remarks about ordinary language philosophy:

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47. *Ibid.*, 47.

48. *Ibid.*

49. Cavell, *Must We Meant What We Say?*, 89.

50. *Ibid.*

51. Hammer, *Stanley Cavell*, 42.

[Appeals] to what we say, and the search for our criteria on the basis of which we say what we say, are claims to community. And the claim to community is always a search for the basis upon which it can or has been established. I have nothing more to go on than my conviction, my sense that I make sense. It may prove to be the case that I am wrong, that my conviction isolates me, from all others, from myself. That will not be the same as a discovery that I am dogmatic or egomaniacal. The wish and search for community are the wish and search for reason.

And philosophy can be the fruit, or work in the root, of either. (I associate what I just now called the “breaking up of the sense of necessity” with what in “The Avoidance of Love” I call the “breaking up of our sense of the ordinary”; e.g., p. 316, p. 350.)<sup>52</sup>

The following remark I take to suggest how we accept the terms in which we judge, decide, namely, our criteria; (suggesting to me Wittgenstein’s questions about how we “follow a rule”; do I interpret them, think them, or just grasp it?),

But this is not the way things are. It is a very poorly kept secret that men and their societies are not perfect. In that case, in all actual cases, it is ungrammatical (not to say politically devious) to answer the question “Why ought I to obey?” in terms of the general advantages of citizenship. What the question in fact means therefore is, “Given the specific inequalities and lacks of freedom and absence of fraternity in the society to which I have consented, do these outweigh the “disadvantages” of withdrawing my consent?”. This is the question the theorists of the social contract teach us to ask, and the beginning of an answer is to discover whom I am in community with, and what it is to which I am obedient.<sup>53</sup>

Thus, ordinary language philosophy like the search for oneself, one’s voice, is a search for community—our shared words and criteria—likewise the search for community is

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52. Cavell, *The Claim of Reason*, 20.

53. *Ibid.*, 23-24.

a finding of oneself—one's own words. But it requires that philosophizing my claims and words, or its claims and words that I lose myself to the community—likewise that the community be lost to me. That is the question and answer at once: about why I ought to accept or reject reasons for and against, believe there are criteria of judgment, "patterns of support and justification," or "follow a rule" to play language-games. The task of philosophy is not just to see that and why we agree, but why we disagree about these. As though, we cannot claim a community until we have first questioned ourselves, our claims, and the communities' claims, or criteria—as though, we cannot really acknowledge it until we do so; as though, we take so much for granted,

It follows from including "speaking for others and being spoken for by others" as part of the content of political consent, that mere withdrawal from the community (exile inner or outer) is not, grammatically, the withdrawal of consent from it. Since the granting of consent entails acknowledgment of others, the withdrawal of consent entails the same acknowledgment: I have to say both "It is not mine any longer" (I am no longer responsible for it, it no longer speaks for me) and "It is no longer ours" (not what we bargained for, we no longer recognize the principle of consent in it, the original "we" is no longer bound together by consent but only by force, so it no longer exists). Dissent is not the undoing of consent but a dispute about its content, a dispute within it over whether a present arrangement is faithful to it. The alternative to speaking for yourself politically is not: speaking for yourself privately. (Because "privately" here can only either be repeating the "for myself," in which case it means roughly, "I'm doing the talking"; or else it implies that you do not know that you speak for others, which does not deny the condition of speaking for others.) The alternative is having nothing (political) to say.<sup>54</sup>

I must say, however, that Cavell does not say "disconsent" (a term which is perhaps not common), but rather "dissent," which is still within the community itself. The possibility of lack of consent, or the withdrawal of consent, is not withdrawal from the community. Someone's (a person's) dis-consent would be to exit, to attempt to go

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54. *Ibid.*, 27-28.

outside, to cancel the community, the polis altogether, as it were, to have “nothing (politically) to say,” in public (One thinks of Heidegger’s, Wittgenstein’s, or Thoreau’s withdrawal to nature). That means the communities’ lack of acknowledgement; I am no longer spoken for; the canceling of the “we.” It is only those who have dissented, those interrogating themselves, who take for instance “The Declaration of Independence” (1776), asking: Is the declaration, “it becomes necessary for one People to dissolve the Political Bands” not a withdrawal of consent, the possibility of consent; what is meant by “Laws of Nature” or “Nature’s God”; but what are “the Opinions of Mankind” anyway; or “their Creator,” who’s is that, the indigenous people’s of the America(s); are “unalienable Rights” that of “Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness,” what does that look like, what do these mean. Those having withdrawn consent, to dis-consent, trying to go outside, to make sense, to say nothing, as it were, have found it is not possible (radical privacy); not to say, impossible; or found it necessary to (the need to) return. That is what I take Wittgenstein’s private language argument reveals about ourselves. There is a sense in which, our going outside ordinary language, or the ordinary world, is not possible, i.e. that we cannot make sense apart from what we say we say, in public. That does not exclude, or prevent, that change is possible (that language and world alter), and so, a necessity. This is the meaning I make out of Austin’s prescription that “it is necessary first to be careful with, but also to be brutal with, to torture, to fake and to override, ordinary language.”<sup>55</sup> For that we need to disconsent, or question, or to be questioned, e.g. new language games, new forms of life (I think of Kuhn’s paradigm shifts).<sup>56</sup> But is the condition of reimagining a community, the “withdrawal of consent”?

### **Nothing More Human Than to Deny Them (viz. Necessities)**

What I have called, the sublation of the Wittgenstienian/everyday criterion distinctively, Cavell also suggests calling, “Philosophy and the Rejection of the Human.”<sup>57</sup> I

55. J. L. Austin, *Philosophical Papers* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979), 186.

56. See, Thomas S. Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 2012), 45, developing his idea based on Wittgenstein’s language-games. In the “Introductory Essay” it is noted that Kuhn and Cavell dialogued about “paradigm shifts” (xxi).

57. Cavell, *The Claim of Reason*, 207.



shall explain this more, because I want to show what Cavell's remark means: "the philosophy of mind become aesthetics."<sup>58</sup> When Wittgensteinian criteria are canceled, when we deny our criteria, what are the philosophical and aesthetic ramifications? Is that what we say is "inhuman" or "monstrous"? I glossed the political ramifications above, "to (politically) have nothing to say." I agree with Cavell, that "Wittgenstein's view" is that the philosophical gap between mind and world is opened, in our attempt to go outside language-games—like our alienation, or separateness, from culture's criteria or words or human forms of life. Moreover, Cavell registers,

It seems to me that growing up (in modern culture? in capitalist culture? [I might add "postmodern culture," "hypermonder culture" as inversion or reversal, or "cancel culture" ]) is learning that most of what is said is only more or less meant — as if words were stuffs of fabric and we saw no difference between shirts and sails and ribbons and rags. This could be because we have too little of something or too much, or because we are either slob or saints. Driven by philosophy outside language-games, and in this way repudiating our criteria, is a different way to live.<sup>59</sup>

That is implying that "the gap originates in an attempt, or wish, to escape (to remain a "stranger" to, "alienated" from) those shared forms of life, to give up the responsibility of their maintenance," therefore, our response (as responsibility), is closing that gap. I take this to mean self-alienation, what Wittgenstein records: "The philosopher is not a citizen of any community of ideas. That is what makes him into a philosopher."<sup>60</sup> But then the philosopher must imagine citizenship inside a community—"to imagine a form of life."<sup>61</sup> That is why, Cavell claims, "the gap between mind and the world is closed, or the distortion between them straightened, in the appreciation and acceptance of particular human forms of life, human "convention."<sup>62</sup> But how does philosophizing itself do that?

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58. *Ibid.*, 357.

59. *Ibid.*, 189.

60. Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Zettel* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA: The University of California Press, 1967), §455.

61. Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, §19.

62. Cavell, *The Claim of Reason*, 109.

The dialectic of Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations*, begins by diagnosing "the motive to reject the human: nothing could be more human." As Cavell reads Wittgenstein, he traces "the mechanisms of this rejection in the ways in which, in investigating ourselves, we are led to speak "outside language games," consider expressions apart from, and in opposition to, the natural forms of life which give those expressions the force they have." In retracing that rejection, the end of the dialectic is putting "the human animal back into language and therewith back into philosophy."<sup>63</sup> Again, that is a philosophy in criticism of itself.

To be sure, Cavell offers particular examples containing this movement of rejection and return in particular, within Wittgensteinian grammar, in order to illuminate the function of everyday criteria, he had said, "criteria are specifications a given person or group sets up on the basis of which (by means of, in terms of which) to judge (assess, settle) whether something has a particular status or value."<sup>64</sup> I think Cavell is right that Wittgenstein takes up are our mutual agreements *in* definitions and judgments, apart from which we cannot say what we should say, namely—"the *saying* of something is essential to what is meant."<sup>65</sup> So criteria carry the conditions of itself? For this reason, Wittgenstein intimates, "that every sentence in our language [I insert "ordinary language" here] 'is in order as it is'."<sup>66</sup> But how do we ever arrive at these conditions, or conventions—even the human community itself—how can they all be fixed beforehand?

The conventions we appeal to may be said to be "fixed," "adopted," "accepted," etc. by us; but this does not now mean that what we have fixed or adopted are (merely) the (conventional) *names* of things. The conventions which control the application of grammatical criteria are fixed not by customs or some particular concord or agreement which might, without disrupting the texture of our lives, be changed where convenience suggests a change.<sup>67</sup>

Then how are our criteria, language, or community, fixed at all?

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63. *Ibid.*, 207.

64. *Ibid.*, 9.

65. *Ibid.*, 208.

66. Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, §98.

67. Cavell, *The Claim of Reason*, 110.

We need to get clear about what can change, and what we cannot say, what we can do, and not; that means what is necessary, what is contingent in what we say when. Cavell claims, “They are, rather, fixed by the nature of human life itself, the human fix itself, by those [Wittgenstein says] ‘very general facts of nature’ which are ‘unnoticed only because so obvious’.”<sup>68</sup> In Cavell’s Wittgenstein, I gather that the general facts of human nature, are exemplified in recognizing that intention needs action, that action needs movement, that movement entails consequences, perhaps unintended. Further, self-knowledge and knowledge of others is dependent “upon the way our minds are expressed (and distorted) in word and deed and passion; that actions and passions have histories.”<sup>69</sup> This is exemplified, in the contemporary cultural protests and conflicts, between movements, or slogans, such as “Black lives matter” and “All lives matter” and “Blue lives matter”; each succeeding slogan is a distortion, or antagonism, in response to the previous expression by a human group, or community. I want to say, philosophy of mind begins to dissolve (but into what?) into aesthetics. Regarding distortions, or deformations, of our ordinary language, of our actions, Cavell recounts,

That human beings on the whole do not respond in these ways is [what we cannot say, or do], therefore, seriously referred to as conventional; but now we are thinking of convention not as the arrangements a particular culture has found convenient, in terms of its history... for effecting the necessities of human existence, but as those forms of life which are normal to any group of creatures we call human, any group about which we will say, for example, that they have a past to which they respond...

What we may find astonishing is just how deep agreement, convention, goes in ordinary language. In terms of whatever is “human” still more astonishing, is that fact that difference (as disagreement or change) is rampant. I take that is why Wittgenstein suggests, “If you want to say that [other language games are...] therefore incomplete, ask yourself whether our own language is complete.”<sup>70</sup> I am tempted to answer,

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68. Ibid., 110.

69. Ibid., 110.

70. Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, §18.

so to say, “Yes”—ordinary language is complete—and “No”—ordinary language is not complete. As a result, Cavell remarks,

Here the array of “conventions” are not patterns of life which differentiate human beings from one another, but those exigencies of conduct and feeling which all humans share. Wittgenstein’s discovery, or rediscovery, is of the depth of convention in human life; a discovery which insists not only on the conventionality of human society but, we could say, on the conventionality of human nature itself.<sup>71</sup>

In Cavell’s Wittgenstein the differences in ordinary language—differences in differences—are intrinsic to human forms of life. They reveal rather than a homogeneous, human nature (or conceptual scheme), the heterogenous: we are not all the same, speak, live the same way, but share *this*—we are different, speak differently, *live* differently, even *die* differently—we might say, that is what is common to us all, or necessary (or the need in being human). Similarly, J. L. Austin’s imagining different conceptual schemes, suggests that upon listening to “a story or two, and everybody will not merely agree that they are completely different, but even discover for himself what the difference is and what each means.” Austin claims, “ordinary language is *not* the last word” and further, “it can everywhere be supplemented and improved upon and superseded,” suggesting that we not forget, “it is the *first* word.”<sup>72</sup>

But then how do we, can we speak to each other, speak at all? How do we understand the human? Read it? I take it, that is traditionally the repressed fear, behind the resistance or avoidance of fundamental differences in the conversation of humanity, about our schemes of concepts, or the refusal of divergent conceptual schemes among different human ways of being. But, perhaps this is Cavell’s brilliance (akin to the Apostle Paul’s “to be known and read by all” (2 *Corinthians* 3:2)), “The idea of the allegory of words is that human expressions, the human figure, to be grasped, must be read.”<sup>73</sup> What does that mean? The answer is that “To know another mind is to interpret a physiognomy, and the message of this region of the *Investigations* is that

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71. Cavell, *The Claim of Reason*, 111.

72. J. L. Austin, *Philosophical Papers* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979), 184-85.

73. Cavell, *The Claim of Reason*, 356.

this is not a matter of “mere knowing.” I have to read the physiognomy, and see the creature according to my reading, and treat it according to my seeing.”<sup>74</sup> I, however, disagree with, find that the word “interpretation” is unhelpful here, since, *seeing as* is not equal to interpreting.<sup>75</sup> In other words, I prefer to put it, “don’t think, but look!” (in Wittgenstein’s prescription),<sup>76</sup> I have to respond, to be responded to; i.e. our responsibility in recognizing and misrecognizing each other; perhaps, our problems arise because we interpret each other rather than just accepting each other as other. In the following Cavell explains,

[Wittgenstein said] The human body is the best picture of the human soul — not, I feel like adding, primarily because it represents the soul but because it expresses it. The body is the field of expression of the soul. The body is of the soul; it is the soul's; a human soul has a human body. (Is this incomprehensible? Is it easier to comprehend the idea that it is the body which has the soul? (Cf. §283.) It does seem more comprehensible (though of course no less figurative) to say that this "having" is done by me: it is I who have both a body and a soul, or mind.) An ancient picture takes the soul to be the possession of the body, its prisoner, condemned for life.<sup>77</sup>

For Wittgenstein’s Wittgenstein (against Cavell’s Wittgenstein) the philosophical problems, resulted from our interpretations, or identification by differentiation (equally, I think that “interpretation” is the problem in the rule following paradox that needs to be dropped).<sup>78</sup> There is the initial interpretation, namely, the souls going outside the body, a freedom from the human form, and nature itself. But then

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74. Ibid.

75 See, Stephen Mulhall, *On Being in the World: Wittgenstein and Heidegger on Seeing Aspects* (London: Routledge, 1990), p.81, he criticizes Cavell’s use of “interpretation.” In *Philosophical Investigations*, 4th ed., (UK: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009), part 2, §137, Wittgenstein claims: “If I saw the duck-rabbit as a rabbit, then I saw such-and-such shapes and colours (I reproduce them in detail)—and, in addition, I saw something like this: and here I point to a great variety of pictures of rabbits.—This shows the difference between the concepts. ‘Seeing as . . .’ is not part of perception. And therefore it is like seeing, and again not like seeing.” But nowhere does Wittgenstein say, or insinuate, that seeing as is interpretation. Just reconsider §164, clearly Wittgenstein distinguishes these, seeing from seeing as, seeing as from interpretation.

76. Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, §66.

77. Cavell, *The Claim of Reason*, 356-57.

78. Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, §201.

is the soul the possession of the body, or the body of the soul—“a ghost in a machine”?<sup>79</sup> Indeed, Cavell continues, considering another interpretation,

Contrariwise, taking the body to be the possession of the soul, its slave, pictures the body as condemned to expression, to meaning. This seed of conviction flowers one way in Blake’s poetry, another way in Nietzsche’s Zarathustra. (In Blake’s *The Marriage of Heaven and Hell*: “Man has no Body distinct from his Soul for that call’d Body is a portion of Soul discern’d by the five Senses, the chief inlets of Soul in this age.”) It is, I take it, this conviction, expressed by Wittgenstein as the body being a picture of the soul, that Hegel gives philosophical expression to in the following formulations: “[The] shape, with which the Idea as spiritual — as individually determined spirituality — invests itself when manifested as a temporal phenomenon, is the human form. [...] [The] human shape [is] the sole sensuous phenomenon that is appropriate to mind” (*Philosophy of Fine Art*, Introduction, pp. 185, 186). (Thus may the philosophy of mind become aesthetics.) How much you have to have accepted in order to accept this expression is an open question, not confined to the reading of, say, Hegel.<sup>80</sup>

As I see the soul/body distinction, or the human being (I am not here reading into Cavell, Wittgenstein, or even Hegel) phenomenon, the problem is just the dialectic inherent ordinary language, our words and life (that is what, as it were, what I read out of it, a temptation to their distinction, to interpret). I understand “Thus may the philosophy of mind become aesthetics” to express that depth of meaning, in what we say when, in human forms of life; *whether* we grasp our meanings; grasp each other (akin to the resolution of the rule following paradox, Wittgenstein intimates, “that there is a way of grasping a rule which is *not* an interpretation... is exhibited in what we call “following the rule” and “going against it.”<sup>81</sup> I would say, that is acceptance of each other. Thus, I take *aesthetics* to mean not mere (theoretical) interpretation of X, but rather how I see X (Wittgenstein’s prescription, “*look and see* whether there is

79. Cavell, *The Claim of Reason*, 364.

80. *Ibid.*, 357.

81. Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, §201.

anything common to all”),<sup>82</sup> and respond to X, how X responds to me, i.e. accepting the human experience of each other.

The problem of acknowledging ourselves’ otherness, I see X (the “human”) as Y (the “inhuman”), how I respond or refuse to respond, becomes the question of horror, Cavell put’s it, “isn't it the case that not the human horrifies me, but the inhuman, the monstrous?”—since “only what is human can be inhuman.”<sup>83</sup> But is the human the only candidate to be monstrous? Let’s imagine a monster, say, draw it—but why is it a monster? “If something is monstrous,” but “we do not believe that there are monsters” Cavell reasons, “then only the human is a candidate for the monstrous... If only humans feel horror..., then maybe it is a response specifically to being human.”<sup>84</sup> Because what human beings can say, and often do (I am not just yet saying, what they are or become), is what is monstrous (what seems monstrous, so to say, that Nazis were human beings). So, what is the criteria of the inhuman? “Horror is the title I am giving,” Cavell suggests, “to the perception of the precariousness of human identity, to the perception that it may be lost or invaded, that we may be, or may become, something other than we are, or take ourselves for.”<sup>85</sup> That is horror. As a result, the inhuman or monstrous is our being, and becoming, other than ourselves. But that is only human.

The acknowledgment of other souls, or minds, or our own mind, is understanding (is acceptance) toward bodies, their shapes, sizes, complexions, or human forms. The manner in which Cavell puts it, “If it makes sense to speak of seeing human beings as human beings, then it makes sense to imagine that a human being may lack the capacity to see human beings as human beings. It would make sense to ask whether someone may be soul-blind.”<sup>86</sup> In reconsidering the master/slave relationship,<sup>87</sup> Cavell asks about what soul-blindness would be? What does the question get at? “In asking whether there is such a thing as soul-blindness,” Cavell records, “I do not mean to insist that there are such things as souls, nor that anybody believes there are. But I do, I expect, mean to insist that we may sincerely and sanely not

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82. Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, §66.

83. Cavell, *The Claim of Reason*, 418.

84. *Ibid.*

85. *Ibid.*, 419.

86. *Ibid.*, 378.

87. *Ibid.*, 373.

know whether we believe in such a thing, as we may not know whether we believe in God, or in idols.” There is the further assumption that believes or disbelieves there are souls and “yet not know that there are human beings.” But why? Because “that knowledge would require believing that there are embodied souls, something incarnate.” As a result, Cavell grants, you may believe with Wittgenstein that the human body is the best picture of the human soul, but against him deny that anything is pictured. Hence, Cavell’s intuition is that is wrongly put, since to disbelieve “there is such a thing as the human soul is not to know what the human body is, what it is of, heir to.”<sup>88</sup> In this there is an implication or meaning I think; in my refusal to greet another (or the other to me); to offer a hand shake; to help; in my ignorance or turning my back to; avoidance or rejection in listening to what another’s words mean; or are meant to express; in such gestures of refusal; I make the other’s existence vanish; so making the other nothing, no-body (“I blank myself” i.e. self-avoidance, repression).

Moreover, human acceptance of each other, the other’s words and life, of their culture’s criteria, is human acknowledgement of somebody, that recognition which pictures the freedom of human expression, to meaning, everything, or nothing. The refusal to acknowledge each other, soul-blindness, is rejection of each and every, shape and shade of body, or form of human life—like the refusal that we have brains, or skulls and bones, or that we bleed when cut—it is further equally to fail to acknowledge the otherness of the other (like the ignorance of so-called “color blindness” toward another’s ethnic complexion and cultural identity; even a critique of identity politics, I intimate interrogating about blindness toward ourselves), or our own otherness to ourselves; thus Cavell asks,

But when [do we acknowledge or refuse to]? If there really was another, and the case failed me, still the other knows of his or her existence; he or she remains. But this knowledge has come to me too late. Because now the other remains as unacknowledged, that is, as denied. I have shut my eyes to this other. And this is now part of this other's knowledge. To acknowledge him now would be to know this. To deny him now would be to deny this, deny this denial of

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88. *Ibid.*, 399-400.



him: to shut his eyes to me. Either way I implicate myself in his existence. There is the problem of the other.—The crucified human body is our best picture of the unacknowledged human soul.<sup>89</sup>

Nobody, or nothing, better pictures the human than the denial of itself (Cavell understand Nietzsche's "myth of the soul" against Hegel's, meaning "breaking all our interpretations of experience, breaking belief, breaking the self."<sup>90</sup> To refuse to acknowledge the human soul then is to crucify the human body. Thus, the other implicates otherness in my existence. I find in my words and life, that "I deny myself," in relation to my otherness to myself. I shut my eyes to myself. In implicating my non-existence: There is the problem of the self. The enigma is that *becoming* results from *being* and *non-being* (I take it between human life and death). That is the acknowledgement of the unacknowledged—like the possibility of Christianity, or its impossibility, is accepting Jesus hanging on the cross, the Crucified God. The difference in identity, both Hegel and Kierkegaard, recognizing the development of the self, is only through the cross.<sup>91</sup> Put differently, I take up Cavell's confession, "In the case of my knowing myself, such self-defeat would be doubly exquisite: I must disappear in order that the search for myself be successful."<sup>92</sup>

## Closing

In drawing some conclusions, some concessions, or not fully accepting Cavell's Wittgenstein, instead a self-description, or differentiation from Wittgenstein's Wittgenstein: I reject philosophy's rejection of the human; I resist the gap between my mind and the world, or close it; I confront contemporary culture's criteria, its words and life, in taking up my words and life, or right to speak out loud, or to silence; I reject Hegel's formulation of philosophy:

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89. *Ibid.*, 430.

90. *Ibid.*, 366.

91. See, Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, §77, 808; Søren Kierkegaard, *The Sickness Unto Death* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1983), 70.

92. Cavell, *The Claim of Reason*, 352.

Only one word more concerning the desire to teach the world what it ought to be. For such a purpose philosophy at least always comes too late. Philosophy, as the thought of the world, does not appear until reality has completed its formative process, and made itself ready. History thus corroborates the teaching of the conception that only in the maturity of reality does the ideal appear as counterpart to the real, apprehends the real world in its substance, and shapes it into an intellectual kingdom. When philosophy paints its grey in grey, one form of life has become old, and by means of grey it cannot be rejuvenated, but only known. The owl of Minerva, takes its flight only when the shades of night are gathering.<sup>93</sup>

To take honestly, or adopt passionately Wittgenstein's dialogues (even dialectic, *I must break the real*), there is only one more word about its teaching: philosophy is not too late; it is has not yet begun. Cavell registered he could understand the meaning in Hegel was "the last professor of philosophy";<sup>94</sup> I might say then that Wittgenstein was "the first professor of philosophy." Because forms of life become new, are rejuvenated, revived. Everyday. That contingency, necessity, is unacknowledged. It is not dusk, here and now, but dawning. I acknowledge the unacknowledged: "What has to be accepted, the given, is—one might say—forms of life."<sup>95</sup> The thing then to take notice of, primarily, and which is tantamount (difference by identity), that Wittgenstein did not say, "form of life." Hegel did. Los gallos cantan en las mañanas.

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93. Hegel, *Philosophy of Right*, trans. S. W. Dyde (London: Goerge Bell and Sons, 1896), xxx.

94. Cavell, *Must We Meant What We Say?*, xxxvi.

95. Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, part 2, §345.