

Anti-Japanese Nationalism and Economic Growth in the Context of the Diaoyu/Senkaku Island Dispute: Mutually Opposing Pillars of Legitimization

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In September 2012, massive and violent anti-Japanese protests broke out in more than 100 cities throughout China. Japanese businesses, restaurants and multinational corporations were targeted and Japanese people were attacked on the streets. The protests were a result of the Japanese Government's decision to purchase and nationalize three islands in the East China Sea located in the island grouping known as Diaoyu in China and Senkaku in Japan over which both countries have competing sovereignty claims. The purchase occurred only months after nationalist demonstrators from both Hong Kong and Japan independently planted their respective flags on the islands and only a week before the 81st anniversary of the Mukden incident.¹ The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has yet to enact any economic sanctions on Japan and at the time acted to limit protests; state-run media urged restraint and the police became more assertive. These protests were the largest and most violent anti-Japanese demonstrations in China since those of 2004-2005, which were also a result of the Diaoyu/Senkaku Island dispute. Japan has effectively controlled and administered the uninhabited islands for more than a century, having first annexed them after the first Sino-Japanese war of 1895 (Nicoll 2012, 3). Conversely, China's historical claim dates back centuries, though it did not formally claim the island until 1970 when a geological survey conducted under the auspices of the United Nations Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East suggested that 'a high probability exists that the continental shelf between Taiwan and Japan may be one of the most prolific oil reserves in the world' (Gyo Koo 2011, 161).

In December 2012, a Chinese patrol plane, a symbol of Chinese sovereignty, flew within the airspace claimed by Japan. Not long after being spotted, Japanese F-15 Fighter Jets were dispatched as a demonstration of Japanese sovereignty. In an article published in the People's Daily, Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi claimed that the Japanese purchase was illegal and stated that China would "resolutely fight against the Japanese side." (Perlez 2012). Throughout this article, it will be demonstrated that this hard-line anti-Japanese rhetoric on behalf of China's Foreign Minister should not be seen as a true military threat. China and Japan have quarreled over these islands several times in the past and not once has the situation escalated to the point where either side used force against the other. Some may

¹ A staged event engineered by Japanese military personnel, the Mukden or Manchurian Incident served as a pretext for the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931.

argue that China is not capable of escalating the dispute through military means for fear of a strong and effective riposte from Japan and perhaps even the United States; still overwhelmingly the world's most dominant power at sea. While this certainly may be true, until recently, the United States has abstained from formally committing its military to Japan should a conflict erupt (McCurry 2014). Rather, the most important factor in determining the peaceful outcome of past disputes has been the fact that China and Japan are two of the most economically interdependent countries in the world.

It will be demonstrated that the CCP does not want to engage Japan militarily over the disputed Diaoyu/Senkaku islands. On the contrary, Chinese nationalism, as it has been constructed by the state to be anti-Japanese, is a source of legitimacy for the CCP meaning that the party must utter strong anti-Japanese rhetoric domestically and, to a certain extent internationally, while at the same time being careful not to disturb its important trading relationship with Japan and the world. An example of such rhetoric from Beijing is the unilateral declaration of an 'Air Defense Identification Zone' over an area covering the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands as well as Leodo Island claimed by South Korea. Should China attempt to strictly enforce this declaration, it would require that all foreign aircraft report to Beijing before entering the zone. Far from acting as a deterrent, the declaration seemingly backfired from a foreign policy perspective, giving common cause to Japan and South Korea and further involving the United States in the region. In response to this declaration, the United States immediately flew two unarmed B-52 aircraft through the area and Japan and South Korea have reported violating China's terms on numerous occasions. Indeed, China has periodically sent military and surveillance aircraft on patrol missions through the zone, but they have yet to make contact with any foreign incursions (Fisher 2013).

So why did China declare this zone without the means, or possibly the will to enforce it? Considering that Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has been posturing to amend Japan's post-war constitution, thus removing certain limitations on the operations of its military, China's actions could certainly be framed in terms of realism and power politics. Alternatively, they are perhaps the result of weakened internal factions following a transition of leadership. However, what is more likely, is that the CPP intended on boosting its own internal legitimacy by appearing to challenge Japan for the simple reason that it's citizens demand as much. According to Kelly, "the CPP may not want a conflict with Japan, but it's been telling Chinese youth for 20+ years that Japan is greatly responsible for the '100 years of humiliation' (Kelly 2014). Moreover, the CCP finds legitimacy in the form of economic growth. In the context of globalization, what will ultimately prevent China from

provoking a military conflict is economic interdependence with Japan. The CCP therefore must act only insofar that it feels threatened domestically by the expression of anti-Japanese nationalism through mass protests.

This paper is divided into five sections. The first section, using social constructivist theory, demonstrates that a government is only legitimate so long as those that it governs believe it to be. It continues with a historical analysis of how the CCP faced a severe legitimacy crisis following the events of Tiananmen Square and therefore, along with economic growth, located a new source of legitimacy in the form of nationalism. The second section, locates this “new” form of nationalism as being primarily influenced by China’s century of humiliation and the third section outlines how, mainly a result of the Patriotic Education Campaign, it was constructed by the state to be anti-Japanese. The fourth section, explains the theoretical foundations of the economic peace theory and demonstrates that anti-Japanese rhetoric in regards to the Diaoyu/Senkaku island dispute is primarily a result of the CCP’s need to acquiesce to domestic nationalist emotions rather than its desire to risk upsetting its bilateral trade relationship with Japan through the use of force. Finally, it will be shown that as anti-Japanese nationalist sentiment grows the CCP is being faced with an increasingly volatile policy environment in which it must choose between two opposing sources of legitimacy: anti-Japanese nationalism and economic growth, one of which may lead to conflict with Japan and the other to domestic unrest.

How the CCP Derives its Legitimacy

Social constructivist theory supposes a direct relationship between state legitimacy and the costs of a course of action. In other words, the greater the legitimacy, the easier it is for the state to convince people to cooperate with its policies; the lesser the legitimacy the harder and more costly the action may become (Baylis, Smith and Owens 2011, 157). According to Lipset, “[l]egitimacy involves the capacity of a political system to engender and maintain the belief that existing political institutions are the most appropriate or proper ones for the society” (M. Lipset 1959, 86). Therefore, legitimacy requires that people hold the belief that the existing political system is ‘appropriate’ or ‘proper’. Accordingly, Scharr notes that “nothing outside popular opinion can decide whether a given regime, institution or command is legitimate or illegitimate” (Schaar 1989, 20-21). However, he adds that legitimacy flows from leaders to followers and that the ability of a system to persuade members of its own appropriateness is an important way in which legitimacy can be

derived and propagated - “[l]eaders lay down rules, promulgate policies, and disseminate symbols which tell followers how they should feel and what they should do” (Baylis, Smith and Owens 2011, 157). When people fail to respond to these ‘rules’ and cease to ‘feel’ and act accordingly, governments must react by altering their policies in order to be viewed as legitimate (Baylis, Smith and Owens 2011, 157). This is especially true in a unitary state such as China, where the CCP does not have the luxury of losing an election. With no official political alternative, the potential consequences of a loss of legitimacy are extremely high and could easily lead to massive civil unrest, as was the case in Tiananmen Square in the spring of 1989.

In the late 1970s and early 1980s, Deng Xiaoping launched a campaign intended to eradicate all ideological and psychological obstacles to economic reform. In doing so, the campaign critically reassessed Maoism, which unexpectedly led to the demise of the official communist ideology. Accordingly, this resulted in a profound “three belief crises”: crisis of faith in socialism, crisis of belief in Marxism, and crisis of trust in the party (Chen 1995, 27). Upon losing its credibility, the CCP was no longer able to enlist mass support for its vision of the future. As early as 1980, the official state media began to admit that many people, especially the young generation, believed that “socialism cannot match capitalism” and that they seriously doubted whether “socialism can really save China” (27).

Under these conditions, some intellectuals, particularly of the younger generation, began to advocate for Western liberal ideas and called for Western-style democratic reform. This pro-democracy movement eventually led to the large-scale Tiananmen Square demonstration in the spring of 1989 (Zhao 1998, 288). The period leading up to the violent crackdown has been characterized as one where the CCP faced a severe crisis of legitimacy (L. Ding 1994).

Given the demise of communism in Eastern Europe, the collapse of the Soviet Union, the political turmoil in China leading up to Tiananmen Square, and the fact that socialism had altogether lost its credibility, few western scholars believed that the CCP could survive (Wang 2008, 784). This way of thinking is best exemplified by Francis Fukuyama’s 1989 article “The End of History” in which he argues that the Tiananmen Square incident marked the beginning of mounting pressure for change in the political system (Fukuyama 1989, 9). Recognizing this, the CCP was forced to acknowledge that it was no longer simply a revolutionary party, but a party in power and that, in order to survive, it must rely on persuasion in dealing with social instability (Brady 2009, 450). In sum, the CCP could no

longer rely on Marxist-Leninist-Maoist ideology to gain the support of the masses. Thus, it became imperative to seek legitimacy by other means.

Following the events of 1989, the CCP political leadership reasserted the importance of mass persuasion to maintain the legitimacy of the existing political system. It was seen as way to adjust and familiarize the masses to the changes in Chinese society resulting from China's economic reform policies. Leading up to Tiananmen Square, the main goals of the reforms were to promote economic development and to raise living standards, thereby anchoring its legitimacy in economic growth. It was this reliance on economic growth as a form of legitimacy however that was the main source of political instability that led to the student protest movement (438).

Not long thereafter the events of Tiananmen Square, Deng Xiaoping articulated a new model for the CCP to bolster its legitimacy and maintain political power: "Seize with both hands; both hands must be strong." According to Brady, this means that the CCP sought to base its legitimacy on both economic growth and a renewed emphasis on persuasion, or propaganda and thought work (437). In other words, the CCP now maintains its legitimacy and its authority by employing a mix of economic performance based legitimacy and by constructing and promulgating ideology through mass persuasion. In her study, aimed at understanding the ways in which mass persuasion serves as a means of legitimization for China's popular authoritarianism, Brady concludes that "[i]n the years since 1989, the Chinese Communist Party has succeeded in its task of persuading the Chinese population that the current political system is the most appropriate one for China today." In achieving this legitimization through persuasion, she notes that the CCP studied and drew selectively on methods of mass persuasion from the capitalist world, relying heavily on "manufacturing consent" (Chomsky and S. Herman 1988) and "regimenting the public mind" (Bernays 1928) as a way to maintain its right to govern (Brady 2009, 449).

According to Greenfeld, nationalism is a powerful ideology in that it locates "the source of individual identity within a 'people', which is seen as the bearer of sovereignty, the central object of loyalty, and the basis of collective identity" (Greenfeld 1992, 3). As the 'central object of loyalty', nationalism can easily become a legitimizing factor for a government. In fact, Gellner argues, "nationalism is a theory of political legitimacy" (Gellner 1983, 1). In addition, Gellner notes, "Marxism contained the anticipation of the decline of nationalism" (Gellner 1964, 147). It is perhaps ironic that as Marxist-Leninist-Maoist thought faded, nationalism took its place. Chinese intellectuals of nationalist persuasion were well aware of

this link and urged the CCP to “mobilize traditional resources for national integration and social stability in the face of the legitimacy crisis after the Tiananmen crackdown” (Zhao 1998, 289).

The main lesson that CCP leaders, whether conservative or reformist, learned from the events of Tiananmen square was the need to indoctrinate the younger generations as a means of restoring the “spiritual pillars”, dedication and self-sacrifice that was once provided by Marxism-Leninism-Maoist thought (Zhao 1998, 289). It was thus that Deng Xiaoping and his successor Jiang Zemin began to promote nationalism as the one political belief that was shared by most Chinese people. They began to emphasize the role of the CCP as a patriotic force and as a guardian of national pride in order to promote a new basis for legitimacy (289). As best they could, in the name of the national interest, they represented the CCP as the defender of Chinese economic interest against economic sanctions imposed by the West. By identifying the CCP with the nation, criticism became an unpatriotic act (290). This demonstrates how, following the events of Tiananmen Square, the CCP successfully managed to find legitimacy in both economic development and the promulgation of a new type of nationalism. All the while, Japan was the first country to begin significantly reinvesting in China post Tiananmen Square thus laying the groundwork for a prosperous economic relationship that would result in China and Japan becoming two of the most economically interdependent nations on earth.

State Sponsored Nationalism

Modern Chinese nationalism is rooted in what is commonly referred to as its ‘century of humiliation’. It began in 1842 when the British defeated the Chinese army in order to preserve the lucrative opium trade. During the second opium war China also suffered at the hands of foreign imperialists. Throughout the remainder of the century, western nations carved out spheres of influence and enjoyed the protection of extraterritoriality on Chinese soil. In 1890, anti-Westernism fueled the Boxer Rebellion and the Treaty of Versailles of 1919 transferred to Japan all German possessions in Shandong province (Wu 2008, 468). Modern Chinese nationalism was first manifested during the May Fourth Movement when thousands of students assembled at the Gate of Heavenly Peace in Beijing. With them, they carried a manifesto denouncing the decision of the Paris Peace Conference to accept Japanese territorial rights in Shandong province. In this respect, modern Chinese nationalism has always had both anti-imperialist and anti-Japanese elements. Some argue that this wave of nationalism laid the foundation of China’s modern national identity, as well

as the Chinese nationalist and communist revolutions that followed (468).

Wang, in a comparative study of Chinese post-imperial May Fourth nationalism of the 1910s and new Chinese nationalism of the 1990s, suggests that the two are different and distinguishable. It is argued that post-imperialist nationalism was “a rational, progressive and developmental nationalism, which focused on resolving fundamental economic problems as well as on promoting social, cultural and political change.” New nationalism, on the other hand is “a cultural, conservative, and identity centered nationalism which, politically, took a statist approach.” Wang also notes, “whereas early nationalism rose against the Qing Empire, new nationalism endorsed the legitimacy of the communist regime and affiliated itself with China’s authoritarian institutions” (478-479). What is not taken into account in this study is how the new type of Chinese nationalism emerged. According to Zhao, the state led Patriotic Education Campaign was behind its spontaneous rise in the 1990s. Zhao notes that this nationalism could not have easily emerged without the sponsorship of the CCP and describes it as “partisan nationalism in a post-Tiananmen China” (Zhao 1998, 300-301). We will now turn our attention to the contents of the Patriotic Education Campaign in order to demonstrate how the CCP has constructed and promoted Chinese nationalism to have a strong anti-Japanese component. Ultimately, it will be shown that the type of nationalism that resulted from the Patriotic Education Campaign has effectively placed important restrictions on the conduct of the CCP’s foreign policy vis-à-vis Japan, and to a certain extent, Japan’s foreign policy vis-à-vis China.

Constructing Anti-Japanese Nationalism: The Patriotic Education Campaign

Shortly after the events of Tiananmen Square, the CCP began to reflect on the reasons why the pro-democracy student movement materialized. Deng Xiaoping concluded that the biggest mistake for the CCP in the 1980s was its failure to give adequate attention to ideological education for Chinese citizens, students in particular. He noted, “we did not tell them enough about the need for hard struggle, about what China was like in the old days and what kind of country it was to become” (Wang 2008, 788). It was thus that the main focus of the campaign was to educate Chinese people about its humiliating experience in the face of Western and Japanese imperialism. In doing so it became possible to explain how the CCP changed China’s fate and won national independence. The Patriotic Education Campaign was launched 1991 and the first document to be released by the Chinese

Communist Party Central Propaganda Department was entitled “Circular on Fully Using Cultural Relics to Conduct Education in Patriotism and Revolutionary Traditions” (Zhao 1998, 292).

While nationalism has always constituted an important component of CCP ideology and modern Chinese identity, the Patriotic Education Campaign marked the first time that it was singled out as a means of mass persuasion and indoctrination (291). Understanding the campaign and the way in which it promotes anti-Japanese sentiments in China is important in explaining why some youth, who have no physical memory of the Japanese invasion of the Second World War still hold such anti-Japanese feelings today. According to Podeh, state education constitutes a primary tool for socializing the youth to societies main values. Accordingly, both the school system and textbooks become “another arm of the state” or “agents of memory” whose primary objective is to transmit “approved knowledge” to the younger generations (Podeh 2000, 66). A number of studies have suggested that ethnocentric views, myths, stereotypes and prejudices often pervade history books. In sum, stories that are chosen or invented about the national past are “invariably prescriptive, instructing people how to think and act as national subjects and how to view their relations with outsiders” (Wang 2008, 787). Callahan argues that the Patriotic Education Campaign was designed to shift the focus of students’ energies from domestic to foreign issues. He notes, “[a] patriotic education policy was formulated not so much to reeducate the youth, as to redirect protest toward the foreigner as an enemy, as an external other” (A. Callahan 2006, 186). While many foreign powers have wronged China throughout its century of humiliation, as the most recent and most damaging perpetrator, Japan became the primary other, the main enemy of this campaign.

The Patriotic Education Campaign marked an important change in the content of historic education as well as in the underlying themes and messages that were being transmitted. Callahan points out, “according to the records of the National Library of China, no new books about ‘national humiliation’ were published in China between 1947 and 1990” (185). This is mainly because Communist historians used the class struggle theory to explain topics such as peasant rebellions, foreign imperialism, and the Chinese civil wars between the CCP and Kuomintang. They even described the second Sino-Japanese war in Marxist terms, portraying Japanese workers and peasants as fellow victims of militant imperialists (Wang 1998, 790). The Patriotic Education Campaign instead, placed the emphasis on the international and ethnic conflict between China and Japan (791). In addition to textbooks, the CCP constructed a number of museums and monuments to be used as physical

markers of the Patriotic Education Campaign. Of the forty sites that were established to commemorate external wars and conflicts, half are in remembrance of the anti-Japanese war. Furthermore, in 1997, former leader of the CCP Jiang Zemin wrote an inscription on the Chinese People's Memorial Hall of Anti-Japanese War that read: "Hold high the patriotic banner, use history to educate people, promote and develop Chinese national spirit and rejuvenate the Chinese nation" (794-795).

As has been discussed, Chinese nationalism, from the outset was anti-western, anti-imperialist and anti-Japanese, and can be characterized by China's 'century of humiliation.' Fukuyama observed that the rise of nationalism in China seems to be associated with generational change (Fukuyama 2007, 38-41). Accordingly, Wang observed that the majority of those who took part in the 2005 anti-Japanese protest were young people in their twenties, the so called 'generation of patriotic education' (Wang 2008, 800). While it is almost impossible to measure the direct impact of the Patriotic Education Campaign on the attitudes of Chinese people towards Japan, we can most certainly conclude that it has, at the very least, contributed to a rise in anti-Japanese sentiment as a component of Chinese nationalism. As a compliment to the Patriotic Education Campaign, young people may hear stories of Japanese wartime atrocities from their parents or their grand parents.

However, what is most likely not emphasized by either source is that China and Japan are among each other's most important economic partners and are, to a large extent, economically interdependent (Gyo Koo 2011, 153).

Economic Interdependence and Peace

While it is difficult to establish a causal link between economic interdependence and peace, proponents of the economic peace theory argue that conflicts over territorial disputes are less likely as a result of it (159). Two different but related arguments inform this theory. First, that economic trade increases communication, creates a convergence of economic interests, and helps to establish cultural ties that promote relationships of trust and respect between trading partners and that this ultimately prevents them from resorting to the use of force to solve disputes. Secondly, economic interdependence results from trade partners' mutual emphasis on maximization of gains from trade that would be lost if conflict were to disrupt the trade relationship (V. Benson and M. S. Niou 2007, 36).

Analyzing each dispute over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands from 1968-1971 to 2004-2005, Koo hypothesizes that "if China and Japan have low (high) levels of trade ties, they are more (less)

likely to escalate the territorial dispute to higher levels of hostility” (Gyo Koo 2011, 160). She concludes, “notwithstanding the destabilizing influence of resource competition, fluid geopolitics, and contending nationalism, the two countries have successfully managed to contain their respective territorial and maritime claims thus far.”

Furthermore, “as long as profitable economic opportunities continue for both sides, it is likely that a system of control and restraint will become a stable feature of the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute” (175).

Regarding resource competition in the East China Sea, China and Japan have both shown themselves willing to cooperate, negotiate and at least partially work within the framework of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, which was ratified by both countries in 2006 (157). For instance, in 2008 China and Japan came to a Principled Consensus in dealing with their maritime boundaries in the East China Sea. The consensus is characterized by good faith legal arguments and has been negotiated on cooperative terms. It is however, still flawed in several ways (Zhang 2011, 61). Mainly that it does not address the Diaoyu/Senkaku island dispute nor does it discuss the rights of the adjacent continental shelf, which sovereignty over the islands would entail. In this respect, China offered to set aside the sovereignty dispute in order to undertake joint development of resources (60-61).

According to Wiegand, China struck a balance in that it has managed to maintain its claim for sovereignty, while at the same time benefiting from the joint development of resources. She argues that China is pursuing a strategy of issue linking and coercive diplomacy as a means to use the Diaoyu/Senkaku dispute to compel Japan to change some action or policy in other areas. She maintains that China would only drop its territorial claim to the islands if “the cost of maintaining the territorial claim and threats become higher than the benefit of using the islands dispute as bargaining leverage” (E. Wiegand 2009, 190). For example, in 2005, as a result of the island dispute, the largest anti-Japanese protests up to that point had taken place all throughout China. Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao warned that the scale of the protests in China should make Japan reconsider both its wartime atrocities and its bid for a seat on the UN Security Council. In response, Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi made an official apology for Japanese wartime atrocities. Not long after, the CCP reigned in protesters, shut down anti-Japanese websites, and organized public lectures to emphasize the need for good relations with Japan (188). China was therefore able to use the island dispute to influence Japanese actions. However, in reigning in the protests, the CCP

faced criticism by nationalist who considered that the government was not acting strongly enough in regards to Japan (Reilly 2006, 208).

Downs and Saunders consider that the two pillars upon which the CCP has built its legitimacy are mutually opposing and, in regards to the Diaoyu/Senkaku dispute, force the party to choose one over the other. The first pillar emphasizes nationalist goals and highlights the party's success in building China into a powerful state, while the second emphasizes economic goals and claims that the political stability provided by the CCP is necessary for continued economic growth (Downs and Saunders 2011, 133). In their assessment of the 1990 and 1996 disputes they note that “[b]efore each crisis, Chinese leaders had promoted nationalist and anti-Japanese sentiment to increase their domestic legitimacy, while simultaneously trying to maintain good economic relations with Japan to encourage economic growth” (146). In both cases, they conclude, the CCP chose to pursue economic growth at the expense of its nationalist credentials. This supports the idea that it is more important for the CCP to promote performance based legitimacy in the form of economic growth than it is to advance ideological based legitimacy in the form of anti-Japanese sentiment and nationalism.

According to Japan's Finance Ministry, China is Japan's largest trading partner. Not only that, Japan is China's second largest trading partner after the United States (Fackler and Johnson 2012) By the end of 2012, Japan exported a total of US\$144,709,442 and imported a total of US\$188,954,976 from China, 20% of Japan's total trade (Japanese Trade and Investment Statistics, December 2012). Compared to 2007, when total exports amounted to US\$109,060,309 and imports amounted to US\$127,643,646 (Japanese Trade and Investment Statistics, December 2007). Considering that China and Japan are more economically dependent on each other than they were in 2005, future conflict over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Island remains unlikely.

Anti-Japanese Nationalism and its Implication Sino-Japanese Relations

According to Rozman, in the late 1990s, ‘public distrust’ in the Sino-Japanese relations was “growing out of control.” Today, Chinese animosity towards Japan has risen to a point where it may possibly undermine China's national interest (Gries 2011, 268). This is mainly because the CCP is becoming increasingly constrained in its policy actions towards Japan by increasing anti-Japanese nationalism. According to Cheng, “Chinese leaders realize that Chi-

na's improving international status is now a significant source of legitimacy for the Party regime and they cannot afford to be seen as weak in dealing with Japan" (Yu-Shek Cheng 2011, 274).

In the past, the CCP has been able to temper demonstrations of anti-Japanese nationalism, in favour of economic cooperation. Anti-Japanese nationalism in China, however, has continued to grow. According to Shambaugh "as China has grown economically more powerful in recent years, nationalism has increased exponentially." He predicts that increased Chinese strength "is likely to result in increased defensiveness and assertiveness" (Downs and Saunders 2011, 132). While it is true that China has continued to grow economically and that economic interdependence between China and Japan has also grown, China's economic growth has recently shown signs of slowing (Vanderklippe 2014) while at the same time Japan has become increasingly dependent on the Chinese market for its exports (Foley 2012). Considering that the CCP bases its legitimacy on both economic growth and nationalism, if the latter becomes a more powerful legitimizing force than the former the CCP will be more likely to acquiesce to nationalist demands.

According to He, Chinese nationalism has grown more powerful in the last decades than ever before in the history of the People's Republic of China. This assessment is based on the frequency and spontaneity of anti-Japanese protests in recent years. She notes that these protests do not simply erupt over the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands, but over a number of issues in Sino-Japanese bilateral relations. Most importantly, however, is the fact that the CCP cannot necessarily control public opinion or anti-Japanese nationalism. This is partly because society has become more vibrant, but also because there is a lack of political will to suppress nationalism. She notes, "[e]ven thick bilateral commercial ties cannot persuade the Chinese public to stay calm in dealing with Japan" (He 2007, 17). Accordingly, in a speech just weeks before violent anti-Japanese demonstrations broke out in 2005, Wu Jianmin, China's representative to the UN at Geneva, urged Chinese people to view this situation from a long-term, reasoned perspective in order to advance China's fundamental national interest. Importantly, anti-Japanese protests have come to be termed as a sort of 'popular diplomacy' by some Chinese scholars (Reilly 2006, 214).

James Reilly found that this 'popular diplomacy' is unsettling to the CCP for three reasons. First, that it reacts primarily to developments outside the control of the CCP. He notes that it manifests itself both through state media and internet media and is primarily reactionary to Japanese Government policy and the behavior of Japanese businesses and individuals.

Second, Chinese activists have been more resolved in participating directly in international politics, associating popular nationalism with transnational activism. Thirdly, the growth of a partially free, market-based media sector, along with the rapid spread of information technology and the internet has widened the scope of independent information that is available to activists. This has allowed them to spread their activities widely within China and to create broad based international community of like-minded sympathetic activists (215).

Conclusion

Increasing anti-Japanese sentiment, as a component of Chinese nationalism has become the most volatile factor in determining the peaceful outcome of future bilateral relations with Japan. Economic reforms initiated in the late 1970s and early 1980s were designed to promote economic growth but also had the effect of causing political turmoil in the form of a student led pro-democracy movement that culminated in a violent crackdown in Tiananmen Square in 1989. This demonstrated to the CCP that Marxist-Leninist-Maoist thought was no longer useful in soliciting the loyalty of the masses and could no longer be relied upon as a form of ideological legitimacy. In search of a new form of ideological legitimacy and as a way to focus the attention of the younger generations on foreign issues as opposed to domestic ones, the CCP implemented a state sponsored Patriotic Education Campaign. The campaign was a vehicle through which the CCP could use mass persuasion to construct a new sense of nationalism throughout China, one that inevitably took on a strong anti-Japanese component. The CCP was successful in basing its legitimacy on a combination of economic growth and state sponsored nationalism that, in regards to the Diaoyu/Senkaku Island dispute, are mutually opposing. Japan is at the same time one of China's most important trading partners and the main outlet of growing Chinese nationalism. Thus far, the economic peace theory has held true. Neither China nor Japan has been willing to risk good economic relations over the dispute. In effect, the high degree of economic interdependence between them not only places constraints on China's foreign policy vis-à-vis Japan but also provides incentives for Japan to refrain from provoking the fervor of anti-Japanese nationalist in China. Should massive and violent protests erupt, Japanese business interests and Japanese citizens in China would be at risk. As was previously mentioned, within the context of the Diaoyu/Senkaku dispute, China has been able to influence Japan's actions at the international level thus further reinforcing the importance of their interdependence. However, anti-Japanese activism and protests have become

increasingly spontaneous and increasingly violent, to the point where China cannot afford to be seen as weak in regards Japan or it risks losing legitimacy domestically. In the event that anti-Japanese nationalism continues to ferment and manifest itself in the form of violent demonstrations and largely as a response to Japanese actions, the CCP will be increasingly faced with a complicated policy choice between two opposing forms of legitimization. The CCP has urged the Chinese people to act in a reasonable manner regarding its relationship with Japan and has successfully been able to put down anti-Japanese protests without critically damaging its domestic legitimacy. However, Hu Sheng, president of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, warned that if the Chinese leadership continues to suppress anti-Japanese sentiment and ignore popular desires for a firm stance on the Diaoyu Islands, nationwide unrest could bring about “greater trouble than the political turbulence of 1989” (Downs and Saunders 2011, 146). Ultimately, Chinese nationalism, as it has been contrasted by the state, has turned out to be a double-edged sword. There seems to be no conceivable way for the CCP to let go of its claim to the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands without risking domestic political turmoil, massive protests, and possibly losing its ‘mandate from heaven’ to govern China.

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