The Treaty of Lisbon and International Intervention: Crises in Libya and Mali

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Abstract

The Treaty of Lisbon was designed to significantly strengthen the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union (EU). This paper assesses the impact of the Treaty's innovations on the conduct of European foreign policy with respect to international intervention. It seeks to do so through case study analysis of two international crises where the Treaty's effects in this regard could be seen: the civil wars in Libya and Mali. This study focuses on the coordination of European states within the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). It looks primarily at three major factors affecting the conduct of an effective EU foreign policy: the formation of a cohesive policy; effective institutional implementation; and the tensions between national and collective interests within the EU.

Introduction

The process of European integration has underpinned remarkable successes for the continent. Proponents of the EU can point to the social and economic progress made since the ending of the Second World War. Attempts to develop Europe's international role through integration have, however, met with less success.

The Treaty of Amsterdam (1999) established the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy. This sought to bring the various facets of the EU's external action under a single institutional framework, thereby fostering a more influential role internationally. In this respect, neither external nor internal expectations have been met. Conflicts in the Balkans in the 1990s and the Iraq War in the mid 2000s revealed a consistent failure to come to a common position and act decisively on the international stage, particularly with regards the Common Security and Defence Policy aspects of this foreign policy framework.

In 2009, the EU enacted the Treaty of Lisbon. A significant goal of this document, a somewhat diluted version of the aborted European Constitution, was to address the deficits apparent in the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy Framework. This study seeks to analyze whether or not this goal has been met, particularly with regards international intervention.

Definition & Justification of Question

The EU's external influence has been far from negligible. Through the enlargement process, European Neighbourhood Policies and the Common Agricultural policies, the EU has had success in exporting its democratic and human rights norms. It has also had a sizeable role in terms of disaster relief and

post-conflict humanitarian assistance. However, in terms of projecting power globally and significantly impacting international events, particularly involving issues of security, the EU has been largely unsuccessful.

European cooperation on security policy has been notably weak despite the development of a specific Common Security and Defence Policy under the Common Foreign and Security Policy framework. On no issue, save for decolonisation, has European cooperation been weaker in the United Nations General Assembly than on security matters (Radeve 2009). And yet, security issues remain central to perceptions of global power. For the EU to emerge as a major international actor, a cohesive stance on security issues is essential.

Measuring the EU's strength as an international actor is a complex task. However, cooperation within international organizations is one aspect of the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy that is readily observable. If the Lisbon Treaty has achieved its goal of strengthening the EU's ability to act on the international stage, we should see more cooperation and coordination amongst member states within international organizations. Such cooperation will be the focus of this study.

The UNSC is the premier international institution served with maintaining international peace and security (Blavankos & Bourantonis 2002). It is the body internationally recognized as capable of legitimizing international intervention and the use of force through Chapters VI and VII of the United Nations Charter. It wields considerable international influence, arguably far beyond that possessed by any other international body. It therefore seems appropriate to analyze the behaviour of EU member states within the UNSC in order to gain some insight into the effects of the Treaty of Lisbon on developing a European Common Foreign and Security Policy, particularly regarding aspects covered under Common Security and Defence Policy provisions.

The importance of the UNSC as an avenue through which European foreign policy can be expressed is explicitly recognized within the provisions of the Treaty of European Union (TEU pre-Lisbon, art.19). As discussed below in more detail, the Treaty of Lisbon included provisions particularly relating to improving European cohesion and cooperation on the UNSC (TEU post-Lisbon, art. 33). Therefore, we can specifically derive from the Treaty of Lisbon expectations that the EU will more effectively impact international affairs through the UNSC.

Methodology

This study will attempt to analyze the effectiveness of the EU, after the implementation of the Treaty of Lisbon, to engage as a foreign policy actor in its own right. It will focus on matters of security through analysis of the behaviour of EU member states within the UNSC. It will take a qualitative approach, assessing a selection of case studies to analyze and explain observed levels of cooperation. Cases involving the invocation of Chapter VII intervention have been chosen as representative of security issues of high significance and salience where foreign policy credibility is most at stake.

As the Treaty of Lisbon was implemented in 2009, a short timeframe limits the availability of relevant cases. The Libyan Civil War in 2011 and the rebellion in Northern Mali that began in 2012 are two cases significant enough to receive widespread media attention; both crises were highly salient in Europe. Both Mali and Libya are former European colonies, of France and Italy respectively. Furthermore, Libya is a member of the European Neighbourhood policy, while Mali is a significant recipient of European donor aid.

The suitability of both cases is further strengthened by the presence of Germany on the UNSC as a non-permanent member for the entirety of the Libyan crisis and for the majority of the crisis in Mali. With France and the United Kingdom (UK) also sitting on the Council, as permanent members, this allows for the analysis of Europe's major powers. Considering that all three powers have significant foreign policy interests of their own, representative conclusions can be drawn concerning the interplay of domestic foreign policy interests and their possible submission to European interests.

Intervention in Libya represented a landmark invocation of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine, while Mali represented a more traditional mission to protect international peace and stability. Therefore, both selected cases represent contrasting justifications for intervention.

It has often been suggested that it is American leadership that is most effective at uniting European states on foreign policy matters (Peterson 1998). The UK, and France to a lesser extent, has on occasion taken positions in line with the US, but against other European states. The impact of the relationship between these permanent members of the UNSC must be taken into account. The impact of other powers, such as Russia and China, as well as relevant international/regional actors, such as the Arab League, African Union and the United Nations General Secretariat must be further considered.

This study seeks to analyze and explain observed levels of cooperation among EU member states in both selected cases. In order to do so, one must establish the extent to which observed levels of cooperation can be explained from factors arising from the European Common Foreign and Security Policy framework itself, as well as the extent to which exogenous factors had significant impact.

To analyze the cooperation of European states in our selected cases we must I: Determine whether a concrete position was established by the EU; II: Analyze the effectiveness of the EU's institutional frameworks in expounding the determined position; and III: Assess the extent to which national interests were subordinated to the European interest. To achieve this will require discussion of the approach of the EU to each case as well as analysis of the relevant domestic politics of member states and the impact of international factors.

Considering the qualitative, case based nature of this study, analysis will be based on public records of EU and UNSC meetings, public statements from relevant officials and news clippings.

The Treaty of Lisbon

The Lisbon Treaty (2009) sought to address the perceived deficits in the EU's ability to expound a cohesive foreign policy. The intended effect will first be reviewed, that of better institutionalizing the EU's external actions, directly addressing barrier II to cooperation identified above (Verola 2010).

The principle foreign policy innovation implemented through the Treaty of Lisbon was the development of the position of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. This position merged the existing Commission Directorate General on External Relations and the European Council High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy and was envisaged to unify the EU's external voice.

The office of the High Representative was to be backed by a newly formed European External Action Service. This would serve as an EU foreign policy bureaucratic apparatus with diplomatic missions and foreign representative delegations. It would also consist of numerous external policy development units in Brussels. By developing a European body to examine and analyze international affairs, a European position could be more readily streamlining cohesion and cooperation. By better institutionalizing external policy development, the European External Action Service could be expected to address cooperation problems identified in both I. position development and II. institutionalization.

The Treaty of Lisbon directly attempted to address problems identified with I. the EU's identity as an international actor. Article 21.2 of the post-Lisbon Treaty of European Union gave a significantly more detailed list of the EU's external action objectives than the pre-Lisbon Article 11.1 articulating a more active vision of the EU's international role.

Expectations arising from provisions contained within the Treaty of Lisbon dealt directly with barriers to European foreign policy cooperation in terms of I. defining its international role and II. improving institutionalization of the European Common Foreign & Security Policy. It could further be expected that improvements in both respects would indirectly help overcome III. the supremacy of domestic interests in European foreign policy making.

Furthermore, the Treaty of Lisbon contained specific provisions to provide for more cohesive EU action within the UNSC: notably Article 32, paragraph 3 of the Treaty of European Union which now explicitly mandates cooperation of EU member states in international organizations once a decision is taken by the European Council. No such stipulation was contained in Article 16 of the pre-Lisbon Treaty of European Union that this article replaced. Article 34 of the Treaty of European Union after the amendments under the Treaty of Lisbon goes even further, emphasizing the recognized importance of cooperation in international organizations as an expression of EU CFSP. This article was largely designed to deal with the UNSC where only two to four out of the now twenty-eight EU member states have membership, depending on the current make-up of the body. It further aimed to deal with the high comparative level of influence held by the UK and France as two of the five permanent members of this body. This is a major change with the Treaty of Lisbon as it explicitly mandates

members of the UNSC to follow European policy when a stance has been taken by the EU. Furthermore, it stipulates that EU members on the UNSC must request that the High Representative be allowed to present the Union's position when such a position exists.

The expectations arising from the Treaty of Lisbon were to strengthen the EU as an international actor, particularly the coordination of its member states on the UNSC. To test whether or not these expectations were met will be examined through the analysis of the UNSC decisions to enact Chapter VII provisions of the United Nations Charter to authorize international intervention in Libya and Mali in 2011 and 2012, respectively.

Libya

UNSC Resolution 1973 (S/RES/1973), authorizing the use of force to resolve Libya's internal conflict in March 2011, is a landmark document in international diplomacy. It marks the first actualization of the principles contained in the R2P doctrine adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 2005. The vote on S/RES/1973 marks a significant failure in European cooperation. Germany abstained in supporting the resolution spearheaded by the UK and France (and supported by non-permanent member Portugal).

While Portugal was mired in economic turmoil, having to contend with an IMF bailout and governmental collapse, the other European UNSC members, France, Germany and the UK, were on the forefront of the initial condemnation of Gaddafi's brutal repression of protests in Libya and later in pushing for sanctions against the Gaddafi regime as it attempted to suppress rebellion through the murder and terrorizing of its citizenry. This reflected the statements of the EU as articulated through Baroness Catherine Ashton in her role as High Representative for European Foreign and Security Policy. In one of her first official statements on the unfolding crisis in Libya, made on behalf of the EU, High Representative Catherine Ashton stated:

> *We strongly condemn the violence and use of force against civilians and deplore the repression against peaceful demonstrators which has resulted in the deaths of hundreds of civilians. These brutal mass violations of human rights are unacceptable. (Ashton 2011a)*

Similar strong language was used by the High Representative throughout the crisis (Ashton 2011b; Ashton 2011c; Ashton 2011d; Ashton 2011e; Ashton 2012).

However, as the violence in Libya escalated and the debate moved beyond sanctions and began to focus on the imposition of a "no fly zone" to protect Libyan citizens from aerial assault, limits in European cooperation began to emerge (BBC 2011). Both France and the UK attempted to lead attempts to form a coalition to endorse the creation of a "no fly zone", while Germany could not be convinced (Erlanger 2011; Wittig 2011).

Germany's vote of abstention marked a significant failure in European foreign policy cooperation and caused significant tension between Europe's major powers (Spiegel 2011). Nonetheless, it is worth noting that in a telephone exchange between German Chancellor Angela Merkel and French President Nicolas Sarkozy it was made clear that Germany would not block the efforts of the UK and France to establish a "no-fly zone" (Brockmeier 2012). While Berlin would not vote in support of the resolution, it did not attempt to obstruct the passage of the resolution or encourage international opposition and actually contributed substantively to the resolution's sanctioning elements (Brockmeier 2012).

Further lack of cooperation was observed when France unilaterally recognized the Libyan Transitional National Council as the sole representatives of the Libyan people. London and Berlin both distanced themselves from this decision which was largely credited with disrupting European unity on the issue (Castle 2011; Sanger 2011); France again caused consternation after intervention when it emerged that it was supplying rebels in Libya with arms and ammunition without the knowledge of the EU. This prompted further controversy as such actions violated the terms of S/RES/1970 and although the French action could be justified under provisions within S/RES/1973, the unity and legitimacy of the intervention in Libya was damaged in the international community (Pineau & Irish 2011; New York Times 2011; Al Jazeera 2011). While the EU was unable to formulate a common position when it came to the authorization of the "use of force" it was reasonably prominent, offering a coherent message, in the initial stages of the Libyan crisis.

The EU was forceful in its condemnation of the excessive violence exhibited by the Gaddafi regime. It articulated, through Baroness Catherine Ashton, a strong stance that called for an end to the violence and then for the removal of Gaddafi from power (Ashton 2011a; Ashton 2011c). The EU also collectively imposed sanctions upon the Libyan Government that went significantly beyond the restrictions imposed by the UNSC S/RES/1970 (Ashton 2011c).

Many in the international community shared Germany's discomfort at the idea of military engagement in Libya. Many European countries voiced similar concerns at EU (and North Atlantic Treaty Organization) meetings, Italy in particular (Dombey 2011). As such, while the EU was strong in its condemnation of Gaddafi's actions and imposed sanctions that went far beyond S/RES/1970, when it came to the utilization of force the EU found itself without a collective stance. As the international community moved towards intervention, the EU remained reliant on sanctions that had proved insufficient and on empty rhetoric of condemnation.

The credibility of the EU as an international actor in Libya was undermined by its lack of a stance on intervention when the crisis came to a climax. However, after the initial military intervention took place, the EU again began to take a major role in Libya. With Libya's participation in the European Neighbourhood Policy, its close proximity to Europe's border, and colonial ties with Italy, it was evident that Europe would be required to take a major role in the eventual reconstruction of the Libyan state.

Numerous European states indicated their willingness to contribute to any post conflict reconstruction mission in Libya, including Germany (Cooper 2011). The EU played a leading role in fundraising for aid

relief for Libya and even established a post-conflict reconstruction force known as EUFOR Libya (Ashton 2011e). It was expected to perform post-conflict reconstruction duties. Due to an international preference for the utilization of non-Western troops EUFOR Libya never actually saw field deployment. However, the intention behind EUFOR Libya evidences a high level of cooperation in the post conflict reconstruction of Libya.

Both before intervention and in terms of post intervention state reconstruction the EU developed a cohesive position that they were able to effect with reasonable success. However, no coordinated position could be developed when it came to the ultimate issue: the use of military force.

The German government was adamant that they would not be part of any military intervention in Libya. Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle, leader of the junior government FDP party, was particularly forceful in his pacifism (Spiegel 2011). Germany has long been highly reluctant to put its troops on the ground. Additionally, support for Westerwelle's FDP had been dwindling since it entered government and pacifism was particularly appealing to their voter base (Brockmeier 2012). A reluctance to engage in any overt military operation appears the decisive factor in the German reluctance to back S/RES/1973.

If Germany represented the non-interventionist pole within the UNSC, then France was the most vocal proponent of intervention. Of the five permanent members of the UNSC, France is, by a sizeable margin, the least significant in terms of international clout. This has left the French state rather protective of its privileged position within the international community. Prestige through international endeavours is thereby of high importance in French statesmanship. Libya offered a chance for France to take a position of global leadership. The lack of strong US leadership afforded France an opportunity to take a leading role. The domestic support for French intervention stood in stark contrast to public attitudes in Germany, the US or the rest of the EU. Whereas other Western publics in general were highly wary of being embroiled in any more thankless conflicts abroad, the French parliament strongly endorsed President Nicolas Sarkozy's stance on Libya (Irish & Picy 2011).

The UK was also enthusiastic about military intervention in Libya, albeit to a lesser extent than France. In meetings of the Council of the European Union, British Prime Minister Cameron and French President Sarkozy were jointly seen as the prime proponents of intervention (Bumiller 2011). British attitudes to intervention were sullied with the Iraq War and in the aftermath of the Chilcot inquiry. However, Libya offered a chance to redeem international perceptions of the utilization of UK military power with the backing of the international community.

The final European member of the UNSC during the Libyan conflict was non-permanent member Portugal. Suffering from economic meltdown, the crisis in Libya was overshadowed in Portugal by the imposition of an International Monetary Fund bailout and the collapse of the government. The national interest of Portugal necessitated its taking a rather limited role in foreign policy. While Portugal voted in favour of the intervention, its contributions to the debate developed little beyond

the general consensus views previously stated by international organizations and fellow UNSC members.

Outside of the UNSC, national interests also played a role in stymieing European cooperation with regards to Libya. Italy was quite obstructive in attempts to rally support for intervention. Berlusconi had been particularly active in trying to attract Libyan trade, even allowing a major Roman park be appropriated to accommodate Gaddafi's sizeable tents when the Libyan leader visited in June 2009 (Krause-Jackson 2011). Italy was the most vocal critic of European action on Libya being both slow to break ties with the Gaddafi regime then criticizing the NATO intervention by June 2011 (RTENews 2011; Ide 2011). These differences in national interests were highly detrimental to attempts to formulate a common European position.

One of the primary factors facilitating international intervention in Libya was the remarkably high level of international support for such action. Gaddafi's actions and threats were so extreme that inaction was seen by many as unconscionable. The UNSC's moves to impose sanctions (S/RES/1970) and later to endorse military intervention (S/RES/1973) came after calls for such action from the United Nations Secretary General Ban Ki Moon, the Arab League, the Organization of Islamic Conference and numerous high level defectors from Gaddafi's government. The high levels of international consensus on intervention in Libya are evidenced by the support of China and Russia for S/RES/1970 and their unwillingness to veto S/RES/1973. Despite the undermining of Libyan sovereignty that S/RES/1970 and S/RES/1973 involved, China and Russia supported the former and did not exercise their vetoes on the latter. Considering the prominence placed on this principle by these two permanent UNSC members, this evidences the high levels of international consensus towards intervention in Libya.

The African Union, and to a lesser extent Turkey, were the sole regional players who vocalized strong opposition to outside intervention in Libya's affairs (Sanger 2011; Cook 2011). The Treaties of the European Union and statements by European leaders and European institutions during the Libyan crisis show a high degree of deference to international organizations. Furthermore, much of the wording used in EU statements borrows heavily from that used in UN statements. It is also notable that EU reaction to events in Libya typically lagged behind that of the UN and tended to reaffirm it. This does not support arguments that the EU was able to form a strong stance of its own on unfolding events in Libya.

The influence of the policies pursued by the United States of America is also significant in analyzing European action on Libya. The Obama administration was at pains to avoid taking the lead in international efforts at addressing the brutality of the Gaddafi regime. It was apparent that the US was unwilling to be drawn into yet another protracted war in the Middle East and had no vital interests at stake in Libya (Bumiller 2011).

US prevarication likely influenced the German decision to abstain. During the Iraq War, Angela Merkel, as leader of the opposition, was forceful in condemning the policy of Prime Minister Schroder to oppose military intervention for undermining relations with the Bush administration. In an article she wrote for Der Spiegel, Merkel emphasized the importance of the US-German relationship in foreign

affairs (Merkel 2003). It is likely that German diplomats were under the impression that the US were going to follow their position and not support the resolution (Hastings 2011).

It should be noted that as the conflict progressed and the coalition became more dependent on US military and logistical support, the US was able to dictate the agenda. However, it did not take the leadership role in the diplomatic, formative stages of the intervention effort that is the focus of this study. The requirement of US capabilities to supplement the French & British led coalition's military capabilities (including Sweden, Denmark and Qatar initially), points to a significant limitation in European influence on security matters. Simply put, Europe no longer has the military capacity to intervene militarily without US backing. This severely constrains the EU's ability to expound a fully independent policy on security matters.

Mali

UNSC Resolutions 2056 and 2071 (S/RES/2056 & S/RES/2071) invoked Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter to legitimate international intervention in the civil war in that erupted in early 2012 when Tuareg fighters, recently returned from Libya, took control of much of northern Mali and declared an independent Tuareg homeland of Azawad. Whereas S/RES/1973, invoking Chapter VII intervention in Libya, was a landmark resolution basing legitimation for international intervention on the R2P doctrine for the first time, S/RES/2056 and S/RES/2071 based their calls for action on the more traditional grounds of reacting to a "threat to international peace and security" and respecting the "territorial integrity of Mali". These efforts were unanimously supported by the UNSC with full backing from the EU.

The international consensus towards intervention was far from immediate. The international community struggled to comprehend the conflict initially, in light of the ever-shifting status of the belligerents. The UNSC resolutions thereby endorsed international intervention in support of a military backed government, of dubious legitimacy, and in defence of the territorial integrity of the Malian state with support from the very MNLA that had originally brought the integrity of the state into question.

December 20, 2012 saw S/RES/2085, acting upon the decisions of S/RES/2071, approve the deployment of the African-led International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA). While the international community had been particularly keen on the international intervention being African-led, it soon became apparent that AFISMA's deployment would be slow and filled with logistical difficulties. A succession of rebel victories prompted France to intervene on its own with Operation Serval, with tacit approval from the EU, the UN and the International Community at large, in the interim before AFISMA could be deployed on the ground. Thus far this intervention has been viewed as largely successful.

For most of the conflict, France and the UK were joined by Germany and Portugal on the UNSC, while the elections for the 2013 non-permanent members would see EU representation on the body reduced to three spots with only Luxembourg elected to a seat. It is notable that no clear shift in

stance or rhetoric on the conflict took place with the changeover of UNSC members. Throughout the conflict the EU representatives on the UNSC remained on message and well coordinated with the High Representative and the European institutions. The intervention in Mali therefore marks a significant level of cooperation between EU member states on the UNSC.

A year before the crisis erupted, the European External Action Service, established under the Treaty of Lisbon, had presented a policy document on a "Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel" (EEAS 2011). It identified that "security and development in the Sahel cannot be separated" (EEAS 2011). Furthermore it identified the region, stretching across northern Africa from Mauritania to Sudan, as a key strategic interest to the EU. It specifically called for more European involvement in the region particularly with regard to the development of the capacity of the generally weak state structures present. Moreover, The EU had long been engaged in the Sahel. The tenth European Development Fund covering the years 2007-13 earmarked over €1.5billion in development aid to countries within the region (EU 2011). The EU stood out as the largest single development aid contributor to Mali, raising over €3.2 billion at a donors' conference in Brussels in May 2013 (EU 2012).

Therefore, when the EU's Foreign Ministers met on March 22, 2012 in Brussels to discuss the then unfolding crisis in Mali, they had a blueprint policy document to work from. It identified the crisis in Mali as part of the larger security question in the Sahel region that was destabilized by the conflict in Libya and focused on restoring stability to the state. While condemning the military coup in Bamako it underlined the "importance of respect for the territorial integrity of Mali" and called for an "immediate ceasefire" (EU 2012). The EU would stick to this policy throughout the conflict, portraying a coherent policy stance.

This first European Council meeting on the Malian conflict also approved the development of a possible Common Security and Defence Policy training mission "to fight terrorism and organized crime in the Sahel region" (EU 2012b). While at that stage the conception of this mission was to be a civilian one focused on Niger, the end result of a military mission in Mali with an almost identical mandate was conceptually consistent.

The European External Action Service appeared to have a significant impact placing the Malian conflict within a broader strategic framework and providing a blueprint for action that the EU could follow throughout the conflict. This suggests a positive institutionalizing effect from the development of this body with the Treaty of Lisbon.

The European Union Training Mission in Mali was another significant example of European cooperation in Mali. It evolved naturally out of the policy prescriptions of the European External Action Service's document on "Security and Development in the Sahel". It was approved by the European Council at a meeting on January 17, 2013 after a request by the President of the Republic of Mali sent in late December 2012. The European Union Training Mission in Mali was significant in seeing 560 personnel deployed from twenty-three EU member states.

It is notable, however, that these personnel were to perform purely instructional functions and have

no combat mandate. While France led the way in military intervention in Mali, the EU's involvement was strictly non-combative. When the utilization of military force became the focus of international discussion on Mali, Paris and London became significantly more important diplomatic foci than Brussels. The EU found itself following the positions established by EU member state governments rather than the other way around.

The EU had previously mobilized combat operations, most recently EUFOR Chad/CAR, authorized in late 2007. This operation was largely seen as unsuccessful and incurred high, unwanted costs on mainly disinterested European states (Haine 2011). Rather than suggesting that the Treaty of Lisbon has cemented the Common Security and Defence Policy framework for EU operations, European action in Mali suggests that the shortcomings apparent with EUFOR Chad/CAR remained extant during the Mali crisis.

During UNSC meetings themselves, the effects of a cohesive European policy were quite visible. At the UNSC meeting of December 10, 2012, both the German and French representatives specifically aligned their comments and stances with those of the EU. In fact, Messrs. Wittel and Arnaud both used the same wording that their country "aligns itself with the EU statement" (UNSC 2012). Furthermore, due to the establishment of a common European policy on the Malian conflict, representatives of the High Representative were invited to speak at meetings of the UNSC as anticipated by the Treaty of Lisbon (O'Sullivan 2012). Between member states on the UNSC propounding EU policy and the representatives of the EU itself being given ample opportunity to address the body, the EU was able to significantly impact the Council decisions. It is notable that the outcomes of the UNSC meetings on the Malian crisis were almost entirely in line with EU policy.

International development was targeted in the Treaty of Lisbon as a major aspect of European foreign policy, heavily interlinked with its security. Mali is one of the world's poorest states and represented a prime example of the interplay between poverty and war. The conflict in Mali also resulted in widespread horrific human rights abuses, on both sides, another issue of significant interest to European foreign policy as proposed in the Treaty of Lisbon. Therefore the nature of the conflict in Mali was conducive to European involvement. Furthermore Mali borders Mauritania and Algeria, which are both part of European Neighbourhood Policies making the conflict geographically proximate to the European neighbourhood and potentially of adverse consequence for these policies in Northern Africa. This provided a further impetus for involvement.

The most significant aspect to ensuring European involvement and the broad consensus of the international community was the framing of the conflict in Mali as a struggle between a secular government in Bamako and Islamist extremists in the North. After initial victories against the Bamako government, the MNLA had been disbanded by a loose coalition of Islamist military groups that included Ansar Dine, which was suspected of ties to Al Qaeda, and the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa, a splinter group of Al Qaeda in Maghreb. The association of these groups with Al Qaeda framed the conflict as part of the conflict against Islamist terror. The need to "fight terror"

through intervention in Mali was prominent in UN rhetoric in support of intervention. The fear of the spread of extremist Islam in Northern and Western Africa was of significant security concern for the EU.

US reluctance to involve itself militarily in Mali meant that intervention would require another Western leader. French President Francois Hollande was prepared to provide just that leadership. Successive French governments have placed high importance on their nation's role as a permanent member of the UNSC and French foreign policy has thereby been noticeably interventionist in comparison to its European neighbours.

Mali's status as a former French colony also influenced French policy during the conflict. France maintains significant economic and cultural links with Mali. Most significant of these links is Mali's status as a Francophone state. French protection of francophone governments has been a longstanding feature of French foreign policy. The significant domestic influences towards French intervention is evidenced by the widespread support for Hollande's action amongst France's political classes. With the strong backing of the center-right Union pour un Mouvement Populaire (despite criticism from former President Nicolas Sarkozy) saw a broad consensus develop behind French intervention (Rice & Carnegy 2011).

UK Prime Minister David Cameron declared the UK and its Western allies to be in a "generational struggle" against Islamist extremism and former Prime Minister Tony Blair called for strong backing of French efforts (BBC 2013; Lister 2013). Nonetheless, Westminster was quick to assert that British troops would not be setting foot on Malian soil and embroil themselves in yet another conflict (BBC 2013). The UK also did not display the same regard for EU policy displayed by France and Germany in public statements on the Malian conflict nor was the UK a major contributor of troops to the European Union Training Mission to Mali. However, the UK did play a significant diplomatic role, which was noted by regional actors and did not diverge from EU policy either in statements or actions.

As seen with Libya, the German Christian Democrat/Free Democrat coalition was of a heavily anti-interventionist bent. Since the responsibility for putting combat troops on the ground in Mali was to fall on African states (and France) Germany was happy to support intervention. Berlin's concern was to avoid an overtly combative role for her own troops. However, German foreign policy under Merkel and Westerwelle was focused heavily on propounding a positive image of German power. Therefore, taking a leading role in aid contributions and in troop contribution to the European Union Training Mission in Mali fit in quite well with German domestic interests. It showed German commitment to development underlining a positive role in the global community.

Portugal remained largely concerned with domestic economic matters and had little impact on the crisis in Mali. Luxembourg was similarly irrelevant to proceedings. Neither non-permanent UNSC Member had major domestic impetus to take and toed the European line on the UNSC. This is, in itself, significant. While the UK, France and Germany are major powers with significant foreign policy interests many of the EU Member States are smaller and lack major concern for foreign policy. That

both Portugal and Luxembourg complied with EU policy throughout the Mali crisis gives some weight to the hypothesis that such states are willing to follow the European line in international organizations.

Analysis of Findings

At the beginning of this study we asked three questions of European foreign policy in the cases of intervention in Libya and Mali. I: Did the EU establish a concrete position? II: Did the EU's institutional framework effectively expound established positions? III: To what extent were national interests subordinated to the European interest?

A consistent European position was apparent throughout both cases. Europe was a prominent voice in calling for international diplomatic intervention to mediate an end to the violence. In the Libyan case, the EU was quick to condemn the excessive violence of the Gaddafi regime and its attacks on civilians. It also pushed significant economic and travel sanctions on prominent members of the regime implicated in violence against civilians. It was also a major voice in the reconstruction efforts in Libya, authorizing the mobilization of EUFOR Libya for just that purpose. The EU followed a similar position with regards the case of Mali. It pushed mediation efforts and raised monies to assist in the development of Malian state capacity. It also mobilized the European Union Training Mission in Mali, which sent European troops to Bamako to train Malian security forces.

Both in diplomatic efforts and in post conflict reconstruction, the EU was a significant actor. It took a leading role in these efforts that exceeded pre-Lisbon perceptions of European foreign policy cohesiveness. Crucially, however, the European position floundered when it came to the direct use of force. For most European member states, involvement in military operations is almost inconceivable. German reluctance to contribute to military operations in Libya seems to have been the pivotal factor in preventing the formulation of a European position on S/RES/1973. Furthermore, the general European reluctance to contribute to military operations meant that France felt better off acting alone in Mali rather than acting within the European Union Common Security and Defence Policy framework.

Both the cases of Libya and Mali bear evidence of the successful institutionalization of European foreign policy positions, once established. In Libya, the High Representative Catherine Ashton was able to articulate a cohesive position during the early stages of the conflict and the EU was able to take decisive action with regards to economic sanctions. Mali offers even stronger evidence of the effective institutionalization of European foreign policy. The High Representative was able to articulate a cohesive position, her representatives were invited to UNSC meetings and European members of the UNSC explicitly followed the European position at meetings. The establishment of the European External Action Service with the Treaty of Lisbon appears to have had a significant effect, offering a template for actions and underpinning cooperation of the EU in Mali.

The evidence from both cases suggests that the European Union's Common Foreign and Security Policy has generally been somewhat strengthened in terms of both position development and institutionalization. However, cooperation within the Common Security and Defence Policy framework

remains problematic with no improved cooperation apparent where the utilization of military force is considered. The establishment of the position of High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the European External Action Service and provisions for EU representatives to address the UNSC all appear to have had a positive effect on expounding European foreign policy positions once established. However, better institutionalization of the Common Foreign and Security Policy does not appear to have been able to overcome cooperation issues over the utilization of military force.

The two selected cases offer interesting perspectives on the dynamic between national and European foreign policy interests. In the case of Mali it was very evident that the European member states were following a common European line.

Both Germany and France explicitly remarked that their position endorsed the common position of the EU, made previously when speaking at UNSC meetings. However, in the case of Libya it was quite evident that the European members of the UNSC were following their own national interests rather than sticking to the common European line. The case of Mali suggests that where the EU is able to agree to a common line it member states are willing to follow it. The case of Libya suggests that where the EU does not develop a common line its members are content to pursue divergent positions. It is noticeable that a degree of cooperation was apparent between the UK, France and Germany on the Libyan vote even if they did not vote in tandem. This suggests a degree of cooperation that had not been apparent in some pre Lisbon conflicts such as the Iraq case. It suggests that the EU has developed a reasonable level of improved cooperation in foreign policy matters.

However, it is also apparent that in neither case was Brussels the center of decision-making. Only in pre-intervention Mali (and arguably post–intervention in both cases) could the EU reasonably claim to have taken the lead in establishing a foreign policy for its member states. Rather, London, Paris, Berlin and Washington appear as the significant decision makers in both cases. Where an EU position was established, it largely followed those made by its larger member states. This suggests that Europe's Common Foreign and Security policy remains largely in the sphere of intergovernmentalism. Especially regarding Common Security and Defence Policy aspects, there is little evidence in either case of significant supranational institutional effects.

Both cases studied showed remarkable international consensus behind the decision to intervene. Aside from the African Union and Turkish opposition in the case of Libya, both S/RES/1973 and S/RES/2072 were proposed in light of calls for action from regional actors and the United Nations General Secretariat itself. The unusual levels of international consensus for intervention in both cases is evidenced by Chinese and Russian support for intervention in Mali and the unwillingness of either power to veto intervention in Libya. As such, the impact of varying levels of international support could not be analyzed in this study, suggesting grounds for future research. In both cases, international consensuses existed that promoted an interventionist stance.

Action on neither Mali nor Libya was likely to affect significant European economic interests (excepting perhaps for Italy in Libya). Further study of European foreign policy where major economic interests are at stake would be required to gain a fuller understanding of European foreign policy coordination

after the Treaty of Lisbon.

It is also notable that in both cases the US was unwilling to take a position of leadership. In both cases France, along with the UK in Libya, were the international leaders for intervention. It is conceivable that US retreat from leadership in international intervention is to become a feature of international relations, in which case the cases of Libya and Mali give an indication of what can be expected as multipolarity is established in the international arena. What is significant is that previously US leadership has been significant in coordinating European foreign policy therefore the lack of US leadership was likely a factor against coordination in both cases studied.

Though European foreign policy in the case of Libya was far from coordinated when it came to the discussion of military intervention, neither was that of the US, a single, sovereign state. As discussed above the Obama administration was divided and prevaricated widely on the issue of intervention in Libya. The EU lacks a strong executive power akin to the US presidency capable of enforcing a decision without consensus within. European non-coordination on the issue of Libyan intervention may well reflect the high complexity of the Libyan conflict and the consensus nature of the EU's foreign policy making apparatus. Unless national interests are to be subsumed by the EU's institutions, and the European Common Foreign and Security Policy is adapted to supranational governance, then such non-coordination seems likely to continue. With the use of force so central to security issues this severely hampers European cohesion on security matters.

Conclusion

This study has analyzed the cases of intervention in Libya and Mali surrounding UNSC Resolutions 1973 and 2072 seeking to assess the impact of the Treaty of Lisbon on European foreign policy coordination and cohesion. It has found the institutional innovations of the Treaty of Lisbon have had a significant effect in institutionalizing European foreign policy positions once decided. It has also found a consistency in the European position across both cases. However, it has also found that foreign policy is largely conducted at a national level, with Europe taking the role of effective coordination where European interests coincide rather than a driver of positions based on common European interests. This suggests limits as to the ability of the EU to develop as a significant international power though both in both studied cases shared European interests and values were enough to underpin cohesive foreign policy coordination during most of the diplomatic efforts.

More significant, in terms of the limitations of the Treaty of Lisbon's effects on the European Common Foreign and Security Policy is with regards its Common Security and Defence aspects. A shared conception as to the role of the utilization of military force is far from apparent within the EU. Furthermore, with many European states unwilling to contribute to military efforts development of EU led security missions seems unlikely. The Treaty of Lisbon does not appear to have significantly reduced limitations on cooperation regarding the utilization of military force that are so central to the development of the European Union as a significant international player on security issues.

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