

# **NATO Crisis Response:** Using NATO Kosovo Force as a Model for Peacekeeping

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## **Abstract**

The ethno-territorial conflicts precipitated by the breakup of the Soviet Union and dissolution of Yugoslavia had major implications for European security and substantially altered the strategic priorities of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in the post-Cold War period. In order to preserve regional stability, NATO expanded beyond collective defense into crisis management and peacekeeping to address destabilizing ethnic conflicts, particularly in the Balkans region. This paper proposes that the NATO peacekeeping operation succeeded as a whole in stabilizing the Kosovo crisis and enabled the creation of a functioning, multiethnic state in Kosovo, which became independent in 2008. Using Kosovo as a case study, this paper outlines a conceptual framework for use in examining the success of the NATO peacekeeping force in Kosovo, known as KFOR, in stabilizing the Kosovo crisis and enhancing regional stability. This framework consists of five core security tasks – diffusing the crisis; ensuring security; enabling humanitarian relief operations; facilitating a political solution; and fostering long-term regional stability – organized around an end state of establishing a stable, independent Kosovo. The paper concludes with comments on the usefulness of KFOR as a model for peacekeeping and the long-term use of NATO forces in such peacekeeping operations going forward.

## **Introduction**

The ethno-territorial conflicts precipitated by the breakup of the Soviet Union and dissolution of Yugoslavia had major implications for European security and substantially altered the strategic priorities of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in the post-Cold War period. In order to preserve regional stability, NATO expanded beyond collective defense into crisis management and peacekeeping in order to address destabilizing ethnic conflicts, particularly in the Balkan region. This paper proposes that the NATO peacekeeping operation succeeded as a whole in stabilizing the Kosovo crisis and enabled the eventual creation of a functioning multiethnic state in Kosovo, which became independent in 2008. Using Kosovo as a case study, this paper examines the success of the NATO peacekeeping force in Kosovo, known as the Kosovo Force (KFOR). KFOR was established in 1999 under the provisions of United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1244 regarding the deployment of an international security presence in Kosovo.

Since 1999, KFOR has continued to enhance peacekeeping operations and work in conjunction with the United Nations (UN), the European Union (EU), and other international entities to enable state building in Kosovo. The paper outlines a conceptual framework to use in evaluating the success of the NATO peacekeeping operation to enhance state stability in Kosovo, which consists of five core security tasks: diffusing the crisis; ensuring security; enabling humanitarian relief operations; facilitating a political solution; and fostering long-term regional stability – organized around an end state of establishing a stable, independent and multiethnic Kosovo. The questions addressed in this paper include: What factors shaped the structure of NATO crisis response mechanisms, including the NATO

peacekeeping operation in Kosovo; and what are the broad implications of KFOR's success in formulating state-building strategies in fragile multiethnic states? In answering these questions, the paper outlines the strategic rationale underlying NATO's expanded role in crisis management and peacekeeping, as articulated in NATO strategic documents and international security policy discourse. This paper also examines the success of the NATO peacekeeping operation in Kosovo using the framework outlined above. It concludes with final comments on the usefulness of KFOR as a model for peacekeeping in crisis and post-conflict multiethnic states, as well as the long-term use of NATO forces in such peacekeeping operations in the post-Cold War era.

## Strategic Context

NATO adaptation to changing strategic circumstances and expansion beyond its original purpose of collective defense into crisis management and peacekeeping reflect historical developments in the region – the breakup of Yugoslavia; the rise of ethnic nationalism in the post-communist states in Central and Eastern Europe, including ethnic cleansing in the Balkans region; and the increasing reliance on international peace interventions in response to humanitarian crisis, ethnic conflict and state fragility in the post-Cold War period. Regarding the spread of nationalism across Central and Eastern Europe, the nationalist principle (the idea of states on the basis of national identity, or the fact that most newly independent states pursued political-cultural congruence using the nation-state model) became the greatest common denominator of post-communist transitions (Zsuzsa and Goldgeier 2004). Although alternative forms of sociopolitical organization were part of the “repertoire of transformation,” traditional nationalism emerged as the preferred option (Zsuzsa, and Goldgeier 2004, 21). The three communist federations at that time were Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union, and Yugoslavia, each split along nationalist boundaries, and “most unitary states began asserting national sovereignties in various forms,” especially as European integration became a real possibility (Zsuzsa and Goldgeier 2004, 21). Although the principles of nationalism and territoriality played an important role in post-communist transformation in Europe, many Western scholars and policy makers thought that democratization and European integration would “eventually render nationalism obsolete” (Zsuzsa, and Goldgeier 2004, 21). This eventuality prompted both the EU and NATO to pursue enlargement policies, the process of adding new member states, to help stabilize an unpredictable situation by encouraging peaceful transformation and regional integration (Zsuzsa and Goldgeier 2004). Unquestionably, incorporating new nation-states into European structures became a necessary basis for stability and consolidating security in Europe, and possibly set the conditions for an independent Kosovo. The factors outlined above may have also reshaped NATO policy, including the NATO model of crisis management for assessing regional crises like the Kosovo crisis and developing crisis response options (NATO 2011).

In response to these developments such as nationalism, NATO remade itself for the evolving security environment in Europe by adopting a new Strategic Concept. This was an official document issued by NATO that outlines its policies, objectives, and fundamental security tasks, advancing a “broader approach to security than before” (NATO 2010a). This revised concept emphasized extending security eastward through NATO enlargement, building new partnerships with former adversaries in the

Warsaw Pact, and conducting crisis management operations outside of NATO's traditional area of operations in Europe to manage crisis affecting European security, such as ethnic conflict in the Balkans region. In order to preserve regional stability, NATO shifted its long-term policy toward crisis management and peacekeeping to deal with emerging regional crises and instability beyond NATO territory, including intervening in Bosnia and Kosovo. Indeed, NATO issued three new Strategic Concepts in 1991, 1999, and 2010 with increasing emphasis on crisis management and peacekeeping in the post-Cold War era. This included improving front-line tools, such as NATO crisis planning, regionally-based organizational constructs, new operating concepts, deployable command and control structures, and task-organized units, forces, and military capabilities. Accordingly, crisis management has been included with collective defense (defending NATO countries against attack) and cooperative security (promoting international security through cooperation with other countries and international organizations) as one of NATO's three core security tasks.

The 1991 NATO Strategic Concept acknowledged the dramatic political changes occurring in Central and Eastern Europe, as well as the negative consequences from "instabilities" associated with ethnic conflict and territorial disputes, among other regional issues (NATO 1991). The new concept also underscored the importance of NATO managing such crises, especially given its unique ability to plan, organize and implement effective crisis management operations. The 1991 Strategic Concept highlighted successful "crisis response operations" in the Balkans, and NATO's potential support for UN peacekeeping operations, among other UN or Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) authorized operations, thus broadening the scope of NATO crisis management and peacekeeping (NATO 1991). Increased cooperation with the OSCE, which has missions in fifteen countries, including Kosovo, also highlights the expanding scope of NATO crisis management (NATO 2014b). The 2010 Strategic Concept further expanded NATO policy on crisis management, conceptualizing NATO involvement in all stages of a crisis: "NATO will therefore engage, where possible and when necessary, to prevent crises, manage crises, stabilize post-conflict situations and support reconstruction" (NATO 2010a). Generally, a policy like this includes a comprehensive, all-encompassing approach to crisis management by emphasizing support for wider international efforts to build peace and stability, including closer cooperation with the UN, EU, and other international actors. The 2010 NATO strategic concept also considered "a broader range of tools to be used" for crisis management and post-conflict stabilization:

*NATO has a unique and robust set of political and military capabilities to address the full spectrum of crises – before, during and after conflicts. NATO will actively employ an appropriate mix of those political and military tools to help manage developing crises that have the potential to affect Alliance security, before they escalate into conflicts; to stop ongoing conflicts where they affect Alliance security; and to help consolidate stability in post-conflict situations where that contributes to Euro-Atlantic security. (2010a)*

Certainly, regional crises outside NATO territorial boundaries could jeopardize wider Euro-Atlantic security, which originally necessitated NATO's expanded role in crisis management and peacekeeping. Invariably, the Kosovo crises threatened to spillover into fragile states such as Albania, Macedonia and

Montenegro and destabilize the entire region. The ethnic conflict, in which both ethnic Albanians and Serbs living in northern Kosovo had been attacked “solely on the basis of ethnicity,” also undermined NATO credibility as the guarantor of security and stability in the core geographic area of southeastern Europe (Brookings Institution 1998). Consequently, NATO intervened in Kosovo to de-escalate the crisis; to protect thousands of innocent civilians from a mounting Yugoslavia and Serb military offensive; and to prevent a wider war, thus ensuring stability in southeastern Europe. The NATO peacekeeping operation in Kosovo also strengthened the relevance of the alliance and preserved NATO credibility as an important regional security structure in the post-Cold War period.

## NATO Crisis Response in Kosovo

The NATO Kosovo Force (KFOR) was established in June 1999, under the auspices of the UN to resolve the Kosovo crisis, in the aftermath of a 78-day NATO air campaign, which led to the withdrawal of Yugoslav forces from Kosovo (NATO 2014c). Originally, the 50,000-strong KFOR, comparable in size to the NATO peacekeeping force that entered Bosnia in 1995, divided Kosovo into five regional sectors, each overseen by a multinational brigade led by “one of NATO’s five largest members: the United States, Britain, France, Germany and Italy” to ensure unified military action throughout the Kosovo province (Myers and Craig 1999). UNSCR 1244 stated that the crisis situation in the region constituted a threat to international peace and security, and underscored the urgent need for the “rapid early deployment of effective international civil and security presences to Kosovo,” that is – the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and KFOR were needed (UNSCR 1244 1999). UNSCR 1244 authorized a civil and military presence in Kosovo to bring stability that formed the basis of the mandate for KFOR, which operated under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, generally referred to as peace enforcement or peacekeeping operations. According to UNSCR 1244, KFOR’s mandate included the following security objectives:

1. Deterring renewed hostility and threats against Kosovo by Yugoslav and Serb forces;
2. Demilitarizing the Kosovo Liberation Army;
3. Establishing a secure environment in which refugees and displaced persons could return home in safety, the international civil presence could operate, a transitional administration could be established, and humanitarian aid could be delivered; and
4. Supporting the work of the international civil presence; and ensuring the protection and freedom of movement of itself, the international civil presence, and other international organizations. (1999)

UNSCR 1244 also included provisions for the establishment, pending a final settlement, of substantial regional autonomy for Kosovo on the basis of the Rambouillet Accords. Although such regional autonomy may function as a “conflict-resolving mechanism,” Svante E. Cornell argues that institutions at the sub-state (or regional) level actually foster regional secessionism (Cornell 2002). Ethnic separatist movements in multiethnic states may have contributed toward increasing territorial autonomy or

achieving de facto independence in post-Soviet political space, such as in the Caucasus and Black Sea region. Cornell also theorizes that state institutions improve the cohesion and sustainability of ethnic nationalism in the move toward sovereignty, particularly in regions where the titular ethnic group comprises the demographic majority (Cornell 2002).

This argument also reflects Roeder's segmental institutional thesis on the causal relationship between segment states and the increased probability of sovereignty (Roeder 2015). Kosovo, for example, initially leveraged increased regional autonomy under UNSCR 1244, including the development of necessary political institutions, as a bridge to eventual state sovereignty. According to Rogers Brubaker in his book, *Nationalism Reframed*, institutions of personal and territorial ethnicity, rather than constraining nationalism, have constitutive effects on people's ethnic identities and interests. Brubaker states that the institutions of ethnic nationality and territoriality eventually converge to form ethno territorial claims to sovereignty (Brubaker 1996). Indeed, Brubaker's concepts of personal and territorial ethnicity are useful in examining ethnic nationalism in the successor states to the former Soviet Union and former Yugoslavia, including regional autonomy, secession and self-determination on the basis of ethnic nationalism in Kosovo.

The Western intervention in Kosovo is often called the "Kosovo precedent," whereby NATO intervened in support of "the secessionist aims of a minority population, principally ethnic Albanians, within a larger state," rather than preserve the status quo (King 2010, 126). Notwithstanding, Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper defended Canada's recognition of Kosovo's independence in 2008 as a "unique" case that warranted an international peace intervention for humanitarian purposes, which eventually created a separate state but did not necessarily establish a new precedent (CBC News 2008). Therefore, intervening in a separatist crisis, such as Kosovo, can be seen as the exception and not the rule by Western standards.

Since 1999, NATO has been leading a "sustained international security presence" in Kosovo, and enabling wider international efforts to stabilize the region (NATO 2014c). Following Kosovo's declaration of independence in February 2008, NATO agreed to continue its presence on the basis of UNSCR 1244 (NATO 2014c). In June 2008, NATO agreed to take on new tasks in Kosovo, including the establishment of a multiethnic, professional Kosovo Security Force, a lightly armed force responsible for security tasks inappropriate for the police "encompassing crisis response, assistance to civil authorities in responding to natural and other disasters and emergencies, explosive ordinance disposal and civil protection" (NATO 2014c). In April 2013, Kosovo and Serbia reached an agreement on the normalization of relations in the EU-facilitated dialogue, which will help improve relations between Kosovo and Serbia; possibly resolve issues regarding the Serbs in northern Kosovo, who do not necessarily want to be part of an independent Kosovo; and facilitate the European integration of both countries (U.S. Department of State 2013). Accordingly, KFOR has continued to support Dialogue agreements, including this agreement on Kosovo-Serbia relations (EU 2013). Periodically NATO reviews its peacekeeping operation in Kosovo, and adjusts its troop strengths as warranted by the security situation (NATO 2014c). KFOR recently began moving incrementally toward a deterrent posture characterized by lighter, more mobile and flexible forces, as security has improved in Kosovo (NATO 2014c).

## Framework for Evaluating NATO Success in Kosovo

Generally, the establishment of KFOR has been successful in implementing UNSCR 1244 and supporting an independent, sovereign, and multiethnic Kosovo. The conceptual framework proposed here consists of five core security tasks:

1. Diffusing the crisis;
2. Ensuring security;
3. Enabling humanitarian relief operations;
4. Facilitating a political solution; and
5. Fostering long-term regional stability. (1999)

The five core security tasks outlined above are based on an end state of establishing a stable, independent Kosovo, which can be used to substantiate the success of the NATO peacekeeping operation in Kosovo. The framework also reflects the mandate for the international security presence in Kosovo under UNSCR 1244. Additionally, the political solutions adopted in order to address ethnopolitical issues in Kosovo supported by KFOR can be seen in this framework used to evaluate NATO success in Kosovo.

### *Diffusing the crisis*

The rapid deployment of KFOR initially de-escalated the crisis by halting the violence and protecting ethnic Albanians in Kosovo from further attack, in accordance with UNSCR 1244, which “condemned all acts of violence against the Kosovo population” (1999). KFOR also succeeded in the implementation and enforcement of the Military-Technical Agreement (MTA) between NATO and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Serbia on the deployment of the international civil and security presence in Kosovo under UN authority, “including the use of necessary force” to ensure compliance with the agreement (NATO 2014c). Accordingly, KFOR enforced the complete withdrawal of Yugoslav and Serb forces from Kosovo, including the establishment of a buffer zone separating Serbia and Kosovo beyond which such forces would be withdrawn; demilitarized the KLA and other armed ethnic Albanian groups; ensured the protection of ethnic minorities, including the safe and unimpeded return of Kosovo refugees; and implemented appropriate border security measures; among other security tasks, to help stabilize the crisis situation (UNSCR 1244 1999).

### *Ensuring security*

KFOR established a safe and secure environment and enforced a durable cessation of hostilities on the basis of UNSCR 1224, the MTA, and various other agreements. In establishing a secure environment, KFOR also ensured the protection and freedom of movement of UN organizations and non-

governmental organizations in Kosovo. Additionally, KFOR presence provided security for ethnic minorities and communities in Kosovo, including the safe return of refugees and displaced persons, although tensions occasionally flared up in ethnically-divided northern Kosovo (Human Rights Watch 2014). Further, NATO helped establish the multi-ethnic Kosovo Security Force (KSF), a lightly armed security force responsible for protecting civilians and assisting civil organizations for humanitarian assistance, among other tasks, in Kosovo under NATO supervision (NATO 2014c) The KSF reached full operational capability in July 2013, and became “fully capable of performing the tasks assigned to it within its mandate, to standards designated by NATO” (NATO 2013). Notwithstanding, NATO guaranteed Serbia that KSF personnel “would not enter Serb enclaves in the north,” attesting to the persistence of ethnic cleavages in the newly-independent Kosovo (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty 2014).

### *Enabling humanitarian relief operations*

NATO enabled the international community’s humanitarian efforts and delivered significant humanitarian aid to the region. The U.S. Department of State estimated that 90% of Kosovo Albanians were displaced by Yugoslav forces in 1998-99, including over 780,000 in camps in the region, primarily in Albania and Macedonia, “two countries with little capacity to provide humanitarian assistance” (U.S. Congressional Research Service 1999). KFOR proved indispensable in providing the necessary security for the delivery of humanitarian aid. KFOR also enabled immediate and unfettered access for UN humanitarian agencies, especially for emergency relief provided by UNMIK and the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). NATO forces provided humanitarian assistance to improve the refugee situation, including transport of food, water and shelter materials for refugees in Albania and Macedonia (NATO 2015). KFOR worked closely with the UN administration on humanitarian and reconstruction efforts. For example, KFOR built or repaired “200 kilometers of roads, six bridges and several bypasses” as part of the reconstruction effort to better enable the flow of humanitarian aid throughout Kosovo (NATO 2000) This case illustrates the importance of KFOR support for UN and international organizations’ humanitarian relief operations as part of its international mandate. NATO humanitarian airlift operations also delivered large amounts of humanitarian aid to the region (NATO 2000).

### *Facilitating a political solution*

By providing security and enabling UNMIK to operate, KFOR facilitated the civil implementation of the UN resolution, including a comprehensive, inclusive political dialogue and constitutional process that eventually led to the establishment of a multiethnic Kosovo. Following Kosovo’s independence and a new constitution in 2008, UNMIK refocused on “the promotion of security, stability and respect for human rights in Kosovo,” in conjunction with KFOR (UN News Center 2014). According to Freedom House in 2012, Kosovo had “substantially implemented its independence framework, which stipulates the establishment of a functional state and focuses on minority rights and the decentralization of power” (Freedom House 2013). KFOR also worked closely with the European Union Rule of Law Mission (EULEX) in Kosovo in order to strengthen Kosovo institutions and the rule of law situation in

Kosovo, including an adequate court system and “multi-ethnic police and customs service (NATO 2014c). In 2011, for example, EULEX Kosovo and KFOR initiated a joint operation to re-establish freedom of movement in the disputed territory of northern Kosovo typical of their cooperation in Kosovo. Generally, KFOR provided the necessary security and freedom of movement for international organizations, agencies and non-governmental organizations operating across Kosovo.

### *Fostering long-term regional stability*

KFOR continued to provide the prerequisite security necessary to support Kosovo’s path toward European integration, including EU candidacy, as well as the Kosovo-Serbia agreement on the normalization of relations and progress within the context of the EU-facilitated Dialogue, all of which foster long-term regional stability. Indeed, potential EU accession has great influence on promoting the observance of minority rights and more inclusive citizenship in Kosovo. KFOR also worked together with the OSCE mission in Kosovo, the OSCE’s largest field mission, on a wide range of issues from building an inclusive Kosovo and the protection of community rights to post-conflict stabilization (OSCE 2014). Additionally, KFOR enabled continued integration of Kosovo into Western security structures, such as the EU Common Security and Defense Policy and NATO. Having signed a Status of Forces Agreement with the U.S. on increased bilateral security cooperation, Kosovo may be on the cusp of moving toward NATO Partnership for Peace membership; however, non-recognition by some NATO member states would be problematic, given NATO consensus decision making (U.S. Department of State 2012).

The application of this framework substantiates the overall success of the NATO peacekeeping operation in Kosovo, according to its mandate under UNSCR 1244. This broad analysis also underscores the importance of KFOR security assistance and cooperation with international organizations, agencies and non-governmental organizations. Additionally, this analysis clearly shows the importance of refining and refocusing KFOR operations, including the ability to modify the security posture as necessary, in response to changing circumstances in Kosovo. The framework can also be applied to emerging country-specific and regional contexts, and used to establish benchmarks as a reference for monitoring progress and evaluating strategy effectiveness. By all accounts, this framework shows that KFOR has proven quite successful in carrying out its UN mandate from establishing security and protecting ethnic minorities in Kosovo to supporting democratic governance and Kosovo’s path toward European integration.

### **KFOR as a Model for Peacekeeping**

The evaluation of the NATO peacekeeping operation in Kosovo demonstrates the importance of NATO crisis management and peacekeeping in resolving ethnic conflicts in the Balkans region. The framework analysis also illustrates not only the success of NATO peacekeeping in Kosovo but also the usefulness of KFOR as a model for crisis management operations in crisis and post-conflict multiethnic states. The NATO peacekeeping operation in Kosovo reflects a “comprehensive approach” to crisis



management, whereas KFOR provides holistic support, including the necessary security, to state building efforts of the UN, EU and OSCE presence in Kosovo (NATO 2012). According to NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen, “the comprehensive approach not only makes sense – it is necessary” (NATO 2012). According to the current strategic concept, NATO also maintains the flexibility to refine and refocus the operations of KFOR in proportion to security conditions in Kosovo in order to ensure an appropriate security presence in Kosovo over time:

*Reflecting the improving security situation, KFOR is moving towards a smaller, more flexible, deterrent presence. We expect this process of transition to a deterrent posture, implying further troop reductions, to continue as fast as conditions allow, and will keep it under political review. KFOR's capability to carry out its mission throughout the transition process will be maintained.*

*(NATO 2012)*

NATO also has the flexibility to respond to changes in context-specific and regional strategies employed by the international civil presence in Kosovo, such as the increased monitoring of human rights violations to support UNMIK's renewed focus on the protection of human rights after Kosovo independence. The UN and other international actors benefit greatly from such flexibility and NATO's operational capability for complicated peacekeeping operations in Kosovo. Third, structured cooperation between NATO and non-NATO troop contributing nations for coalition building can readily be accomplished through cooperative mechanisms, such as the Partnership for Peace program for increased military cooperation between NATO and non-NATO countries, which help generate peacekeeping forces that operate in accordance with NATO standards. Finally, NATO has continued to improve “coherent application” of its own crisis management tools as well as cooperation with partner countries and international organizations (NATO 2006).

Strategically, the KFOR model is generalizable to other international institutions, especially the NATO emphasis on fulfilling an international mandate as the deciding factor in evaluating the overall success of peacekeeping operations. Institutionally, NATO's planning capability, including the flexibility to hone KFOR operations as warranted by the security situation is also broadly applicable to institutions, such as the African Union, EU and the UN, especially regarding humanitarian assistance, disaster relief and peacekeeping operations. Operationally, the KFOR model underscores the importance of formulating a coherent strategy to fulfill an international mandate, among other security tasks, and develop the applicable crisis management structures and capabilities for strategy implementation.

The KFOR model could also be used as a mechanism to support emerging countries, such as Kosovo, in building their respective security capacity. The international community could also leverage this model in conjunction with NATO to support regional initiatives for security capacity building in the areas of humanitarian and disaster relief as well as peacekeeping operations. Regional and global security – managing ethnic crisis and building stable multiethnic states – increasingly may be achieved by responding to such crises using the KFOR model for crisis management operations in accordance with NATO decision-making and agreed-to procedures.

## Conclusion

As shown by the framework analysis, the NATO peacekeeping operation in Kosovo was successful in establishing and sustaining the international security presence necessary to stabilize the crisis situation and support post-conflict reconstruction in Kosovo under UNSCR 1244. By carrying out its UN mandate, KFOR supported civil administration in Kosovo, led by UNMIK, and facilitated the establishment of substantial regional autonomy as well as a political process to determine Kosovo's future status, which eventually resulted in the formation of an independent, sovereign and multiethnic Kosovo. KFOR also worked in conjunction with the OSCE and EU, respectively, on state building and civil law and order in Kosovo, including the disputed territory of northern Kosovo. Additionally, KFOR ensured the cessation of hostilities; the protection of ethnic minorities, including the safe return of Kosovo refugees; and the delivery of humanitarian aid across Kosovo by ensuring the protection and freedom of movement of all international agencies, especially UNHCR.

What can be seen in Kosovo is that NATO has become a capable, effective and coherent security organization not only in collective security but also in terms of crisis management and peacekeeping. What can also be seen in the KFOR model is the importance of effective crisis management operations to stabilize a regional crisis, resolve the conflict and enable a long term sustainable solution. Indeed, NATO possesses the necessary crisis management organization, tools and capabilities to fully implement UNSCR 1244, thus effectively managing the Kosovo crisis, including the political solutions adopted to address ethno-political issues. The continued success of NATO crisis management and peacekeeping in the post-Cold War era will depend on crafting coherent NATO policy, enhancing crisis management tools, and strengthening cooperation with international organizations, agencies and non-governmental organizations. NATO will also depend on the appropriateness of crisis response mechanisms and crisis management operations, such as KFOR in Kosovo – and applying the conceptual framework outlined above to determine the success of NATO crisis management and peacekeeping in any given situation.

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