Abstract — The European Union (EU) presents an intriguing case-study for examining the normative and empirical degree of the securitization of immigration in the post-9/11 context. The following paper uses the Copenhagen school of security studies to argue that in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, the securitization of immigration (through direct and indirect elite speech acts) has legitimized exclusionary policies and practices, thereby constituting a “new (cultural) racism.” This new cultural racism acts as a justification against immigration. My argument will be presented in three parts. The first outlines how elite direct and indirect speech acts creates an “immigration-as-a-cultural-threat discourse” that constitutes a “new racism.” The second analyzes how the securitization of immigration discourse has been implemented through legal and institutional practices, including in the Convention Implementing the Schengen Agreement (CISA), the Dublin Convention, and various border security practices. The final section examines the significance of 9/11 in connecting perceived Muslim immigrants to terrorism, thus constructing a discourse that identifies immigration with a direct threat to European identity and social cohesion.

Keywords: Securitization, immigration; Copenhagen school; elite speech; new cultural racism; Muslim immigrants; identity; social cohesion

Résumé — L’Union européenne (UE) présente une étude de cas intrigante pour examiner la portée normative et empirique de la sécurisation de l’immigration dans le contexte de l’après-11 septembre. L’article utilise l’école de pensée de Copenhague sur les études sur la sécurité pour affirmer qu’à la suite des attentats du 11 septembre, la sécurisation de l’immigration (par des discours directs et indirects de la part d’élites) a légitimé les politiques et pratiques d’exclusion, menant ainsi à une « nouvelle forme de racisme (culturel) ». Ce nouveau racisme culturel justifie les politiques anti-immigratoires. Mon argument sera présenté en trois parties. La première partie souligne comment les discours directs et indirects de la part d’élites créent un discours caractérisant l’immigration comme « une menace culturelle », ce qui constitue du « nouveau racisme. » La seconde partie analyse la manière dont la sécurisation du discours sur l’immigration a été mise en œuvre par des pratiques juridiques et institutionnelles, y compris dans la Convention d’application de l’Accord de Schengen, la Convention de Dublin et diverses pratiques de sécurité frontalière. La dernière partie examine l’importance du 11 septembre dans l’établissement de liens entre les immigrants musulmans et le terrorisme, construisant ainsi un discours qui caractérise l’immigration comme une menace directe à l’identité européenne et à la cohésion sociale.

Mots-clés : Sécurisation; immigration; école de pensée de Copenhague; discours des élites; nouveau racisme culturel; immigrants musulmans; identité; cohésion sociale.

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Introduction

In a world characterized by the increasing interconnectedness of states and the expansive movement of persons across borders, our current political climate continues to construct a binary between the Global North and the Global South. Images of tyranny, disorder and chaos in the South are juxtaposed to values of liberty, stability and justice in the North. This paper examines how the notion of threat and insecurity, embodied in the image of the immigrant from the South, is recognized as an existential threat to the political, economic, and social stability of Northern host countries, with a particular focus on the European Union (EU). Certain developments in the twenty-first century have contributed to the “securitization” of migration in the EU, to include discourses constructed by politicians and policymakers, and subsequent policies and practices. Migration into the EU has become a new source of anxiety and insecurity for many European communities (Waever, 1993, p. 3), and is believed to be one of the root causes of socioeconomic and societal problems in many European states (Huysmans, 1995, p. 20).

Questions about the securitization of immigration continue to stir perennial debate among scholars of various disciplines in the social sciences. It therefore bears great importance to, first and foremost, define what is meant by “securitization.” The act of securitizing something involves the transformation of traditionally non-security issues (or low politics), such as international migration, to matters of urgent security affairs (or high politics), and is arguably a direct consequence of securitizing speeches by state and public officials (Waever, 1995, p. 23). Securitization refers to a “perception of an existent threat to the ability of a nationally bounded society to maintain and reproduce itself” (Faist, 2004, p. 3). Academic literature in International Relations (IR) and international law over the past decade or so has underscored pressing concerns about newly emergent security issues including, but not limited to, international terrorism, ethno-national conflict, environmental degradation, organized crime, and unauthorized migration (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 23). Immigration in the twenty-first century has therefore departed from an economic or humanitarian issue and quickly evolved into being defined as one of the most critical security concerns.

The discourse constructed around immigration mobilizes great support from political communities and gives the state legitimacy to “protect” its citizens from foreign threats. This then justifies the particular migration control policies that would have otherwise been deemed illegitimate (Buzan et al., 1998, pp. 24–25). Much of the literature about the securitization of immigration points to the distinction between the different levels of political discourse and practice, which offers a useful basis of analysis because in any political system, political parties and organizations concerned with mobilizing support from the electorate will frame and select particular social demands for state action (Poggi, 1990, p. 138). Framing involves the “construction of certain questions as legitimate objects of social concern, requiring public action of a certain kind,” (Boswell, 2007, p. 592) and provides a plausible narrative that can be confirmed with existing knowledge about a particular phenomenon. Framing also fills in considerable knowledge gaps with additional, often dramatized, information about a particular issue. Securitization is therefore a powerful means of framing issues around immigration (Boswell, 2007, p. 592).

Although there exists a myriad of reasoning to explain and comprehend the securitization of immigration in the twenty-first century, this paper argues that the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States left a powerful legacy of anti-immigration discourse, legislation and security practices that specifically target perceived Muslim communities. More recently, the election of

Donald Trump has further “crystallized anti-Muslim prejudices” (Eroukhmanoff, 2018, p. 8) by explicitly calling for a “total and complete shutdown of Muslims entering the United States until our country’s representatives can figure out what the hell is going on” (NBC News, 2016). Matteo Salvini, leader of the Italian Northern League, claimed that “centuries of history risk disappearing if Islamization, which up until now has been underestimated, gains the upper hand [in Italy]” (Balmer, 2018). Whether 9/11 dramatically changed the way the EU shaped its immigration policies, or whether they merely exacerbated pre-existing anti-immigration rhetoric is still up for debate. What is certain, however, is that the perceived revival of Islam as a threat to European cultural homogeneity in the “age of terror” has framed Muslim immigrants in Western industrialized states as the new “suspect community,” leading to their systematic targeting by immigration legislation and control practices (Hussain & Bagguley, 2012, p. 716). This paper uses a constructivist lens, influenced by the Copenhagen school of security
studies, to argue that in the post-9/11 era, the securitization of immigration, through discourse and indirect elite speech acts, legitimizes exclusionary immigration policies and practices and constitutes a “new racism.” This new racism further acts as a strong justification against immigration.

My argument will be three-fold. First, I outline how direct and indirect speech acts by political leaders and the news media effectively create an “immigration-as-a-cultural-threat discourse” that Maggie Ibrahim rightfully calls “new racism.” Both the securitization of immigration and the new racism converge as cultural essentialist justifications of anti-Muslim immigration policies and practices. Second, I analyze how the securitization of immigration discourse continues to be implemented through legal and institutional practices, including in the Convention Implementing the Schengen Agreement (CISA), the Dublin Convention, and various biometric border control practices. Third, I examine the significance of 9/11 in connecting perceived Muslim immigration to terrorism and constructing a powerful discourse around immigration as a direct threat to European cultural cohesion and identity.

Part One: Theoretical and Conceptual Framework

In 1983 Barry Buzan, a core figure of the Copenhagen School of Security Studies, argued that the orthodox use of the term “security” to refer principally to survival of individual sovereign states and the military issues they faced was inadequate (Karyotis, 2007, p. 2). Buzan and his colleagues therefore developed a framework that placed human agency and moral choice at the centre of security policies. This essentially highlighted the importance of actors in constructing issues, individuals, or groups of individuals as security threats. The Copenhagen School provides an important tool for our understanding of securitization today, where a political elite speaker can transform an issue from “low” to “high” politics by using direct and indirect speech acts in order to “justify the adoption of “emergency” measures outside the formal and established procedures of politics” (Karyotis, 2007, p. 2). This section uses the Copenhagen School to develop a theoretical framework to analyse securitization practices implemented by the European Union between 1992 and 2000, where the Maastricht Treaty brought immigration under the jurisdiction of the EU, and between 2001 and 2006, thus enabling sufficient data collection of the various border control practices after 9/11. This will be done in two parts. The first outlines the process of securitization, which entails the transformation of an issue from “low” politics to a matter of “high” politics. This will be complemented with an examination of how elite speakers use indirect speech acts to justify securitization of immigration mechanisms. The second part will constitute an analysis of how the securitization of immigration constitutes a “new racism,” how racism acts as a structural facilitating condition for securitization, and how this relates to Islamophobia in the post-9/11 era.

Securitization

To securitize an issue is to frame a traditionally non-security issue, like immigration, as one needing a state or regional body to urgently respond in a way that protects the integrity of its territory. Weaver described securitization as a “speech act” where, by using security-related language, political elites seek to convince their audience of “a special claim to use whatever means are necessary to block it” (Waever, 1995, p. 55). Once political elites have securitized a particular issue, “it becomes ‘common sense’ that it is a threat” (Hussain & Bagguley, 2012, p. 716). Political elites can therefore shape the securitization discourse to include what they deem to be an imminent threat to society. The process of securitization can also be paralleled to that of a “moral panic” in which the media amplifies a social issue, “providing the principal means by which an issue or group is spoken about” (Hussain & Bagguley, 2012, p. 718). Broadening the security agenda to encompass non-military issues has therefore meant that immigration is increasingly examined, evaluated and framed through a security perspective (Togral, 2011, p. 224). Through the process of securitization, immigration has become linked to economic and political issues, thereby justifying exclusionary policies and practices. It therefore becomes important to understand how discourses are used to securitize social issues, thus transforming them into matters of “high” politics.

Discourses give meaning to social and political realities so that individuals, states, and regional bodies are able to make sense of themselves, each other and the world in which they live. A discourse is a “cohesive ensemble of ideas, concepts, and categorizations about a specific object” that frames that object in a particular way thus determining the “possibilities for action in relation to it” (Epstein, 2008, p. 10). Powerful discourses matter the most
because they radically shape the information a community receives and how it responds to it. The securitization discourse is constructed by linguistic narratives used by political elites and is perpetuated by the news media. For this reason, a closer look at the relationship between power and knowledge is useful in understanding how members of the political elite frame certain issues, how the electorate receives this information or “common knowledge,” and how this affects the general securitization discourse. Michel Foucault (1980) eloquently articulates the nexus between power and knowledge in the following:

In a society there are manifold relations of power which permeate, characterize, and constitute the social body and these relations of power cannot themselves be established, nor implemented without the production, accumulation, and functioning of a discourse. There can be no possible exercise of power without a certain economy of discourses of truth that operate through and on the basis of this association. We are [thus] subject to the production of truth through power and we cannot exercise power except through the production of truth. (p. 93)

Foucault placed power within discourse, emphasizing not on what power is, but on what it does. The production of truth by political elites serves as the creation of knowledge through discourse and is an instrumental exercise of power. Discourse of this sort legitimizes certain individuals to represent the “truth,” in this case about the threatening nature of immigration. The securitization of immigration can be analyzed as a discourse through which relations of power are exercised (Ibrahim, 2005). “Truth” produced in this way translates into immigration policies and procedures.

Although discourses and direct speech acts constitute an important component of the securitization process, Eroukhmanoff (2018) rightfully asserts that, especially in the post-9/11 political climate, speech acts can be indirect, leading to the indirect securitization of immigration (p. 6). Indirect securitization comes from “covert security grammar where securitizing actors avoid labelling the issue as a threat, for fear of saying something gauche and be subsequently chastised” (Eroukhmanoff, 2018, p. 6). Oftentimes, elite speakers are wary of being labelled as overtly racist, especially since securitizing religious minorities is a blatant form of hate speech. The process of indirect securitization therefore highlights the link between the securitization of minority religious and/or ethnic groups and racism, significantly how “security is intertwined with racist construction” (Eroukhmanoff, 2018, p. 7). Eroukhmanoff invokes Searle’s philosophy of language to assert that a lack of direct securitization, via direct speech acts, does not equate to a complete absence of securitization (p. 13). According to Searle (1979), the meaning behind a world or a phrase is partly comprised by how the speaker seeks to have the hearer respond to the speech act. An indirect speech act is therefore an act “in which the speaker may utter a sentence and mean what she/he says and also mean another illocution with a different propositional content” (Ibrahim, 2005, p. 164). Ultimately, a speaker can mean more than what he/she explicitly says, which might not be openly communicated in the first instance.

The Securitization of Immigration as “New Racism”

In her thought-provoking analysis of racism, Maggie Ibrahim (2005) reveals how discourses about the securitization of immigration are constructed around the belief cultural difference leads to social breakdown (p. 164). Immigration discourses reveal a cultural essentialist explanation for social issues, “while structural deficiencies such as racial discrimination in employment, education, housing and other social services, the lack of political rights for long-term residents, and patriarchy have been left untouched” (Togral, 2011, p. 229). Immigrants are perceived as disruptive to the “communal harmony” and “cultural homogeneity” of the host country and are considered a threat to Society (Karyotis, 2007, p. 9). The threat to identity is particularly important to many communities who believe that migrants will erode the unique social fabric that make them a distinct political community. This fear stems from a socially constructed fear that immigrants can and will potentially alter the cultural, ethnic, linguistic, and religious composition of the host country, a fear perpetuated by the high birth rates of several migrant groups. Only through an examination of the transformation of racism into a “new racism,” from an emphasis on biological superiority to an emphasis on cultural difference, can one understand both the discourse that paints immigrants as a cultural threat and the policies that integrate and institutionalize this discourse into tangible immigration measures implemented across the EU.
“New racism” implies that racism has moved beyond differences of biological composition to unassailable cultural differences that are perceived to be threatening to the social fabric of the EU. “New racism” encompasses two mutually constitutive parts: first, the belief that human beings have a natural, biological tendency to form social units of people who share similar values and are somehow inherently different from outsiders (Barker, 1981, p. 128). Second, at the very core is the fear of the “other,” mirroring Huntington’s “clash of civilizations” article that asserts cultural difference as the root cause of conflict “between nations and groups of different civilizations” (Huntington, 1993, p. 22). Culturalist discourses demarcating cultural difference create and recreate the “us” versus “them” dichotomy, “positioning the migrant as the ‘cultural other’ and shaping the migrant’s relation to society in a conflictual way” (Ceyhan & Tsoukala, 2002, p. 29). Central to “new racism” in the post-9/11 era is the work of Edward Said who argued that dualist discourses create “the self” and “the other” binary “in order to justify and naturalize some structured patterns of domination and exploitation” (Said, 1978). Views expressed by John Major, Britain’s Prime Minister from 1990 to 1997, about “creating a strong perimeter fence around Europe,” (Baimbridge et al., 1994, p. 422) echoes this dichotomy and continues to characterize EU’s immigration policies. For the EU, the establishment of a fully integrated union with one cohesive, homogenous European identity necessitates the exclusion of foreign migrants. The notion of EU citizens stemmed from the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), whose treaty pushed for the free movement of coal and steel workers (Maas, 2007, p. 17). The Treaty of Rome then extended mobility rights to a wider category of workers and specified, in greater detail, how these supranational rights would be realized. These rights form the basis of EU citizenship today and distinguishes between those groups entitled to the rights of EU citizens from those who are not, namely Third Country Nationals (TCN) in EU member states.

Defining immigrants as “others” securitizes them and is a form of “new racism,” replacing racial differences with cultural ones reproduces “justification for the subordination and exclusion of certain groups of people” (Togral, 2011, p. 224). The securitization of immigration must be understood within a framework of race and race-relations in order to “explain the overt and insidious ways that non-white populations, and most notably their bodies, are read and treated as threatening and violent” (Moffette & Vadasaria, 2016, p. 295). States develop systems of justice and rights to protect their society, and to ensure its security and stability. In bringing with them different cultural values, languages, and identities, immigrants are seen as bringing an imbalance to the nation, as a threat to the existing way of life. By this logic, it becomes necessary to preserve one’s own culture by excluding other migrant cultural groups. This rationale, its discourse and practice, should and must be understood as blatant racism against migrant populations (Ibrahim, 2005, p. 166). As Spears explicitly puts it, new racism “is still racism in that in functions to maintain racial hierarchies of oppression” (Spears, 1999). In the post-9/11 era, Islamophobia is racialized because religious affiliation is perceived as a right of birth (Hussain & Bagguley, 2012, p. 718). Islamophobia “constructs the distinctiveness of Islam and its representatives on the basis of belief and practice rather than supposed biological or somatic characteristics.” As a result, visible Muslims in particular become targeted and excluded from the political rights of the host state. Indeed, as Miles and Brown (2003) contend, framing Islamophobia as a form of racism facilitates the inaccurate treatment of all Muslims as a homogenous ethnic minority group. However, the treatment of Muslims as such has become prevalent after September 2001, thus linking Islam and terrorism with each other.

The Copenhagen School’s conceptualization of “security” provides an effective theoretical tool for the analysis of the securitization of EU immigration policies and practices between 1992 and 2006. As illustrated, the securitization of immigration, essentially transforms an issue from “low” to “high” politics. Political elites use discourse and indirect speech acts to construct an image of a dangerous immigrant who threatens the cultural homogeneity of their respective societies. The securitization of immigration in this manner, one that attributes “threat” to cultural difference, constitutes a “new racism” that further acts as a structural condition that facilitates securitization.

**Part Two: The Securitization of EU Immigration Policies and Practices**

The securitization of immigration discourse, which constitutes a “new racism,” has been institutionalized across the European Union. The Single European Act (SEA), signed in 1986, sought to create a single market that was
envisaged in the European Economic Community Treaty of 1957 by abolishing any control member states had on the movement of goods, persons, services and capital. The SEA established a borderless economic region within Western Europe (Single European Act, 1986). Despite having direct implications for immigration, the SEA failed to include the specific provisions for visas and the status of TCNs recommended by the European Commission.\textsuperscript{47} The 1985 Schengen Agreement filled this gap by asserting external border controls and cooperation pertaining to the Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) Council, which were seen as necessary due to the lack of internal border checks. The Convention Implementing the Schengen Agreement, then, unequivocally linked immigration to terrorism, transnational crime and border control, and detailed how to fight illegal immigration and how to regulate the intake of asylum seekers (Huysmans, 2006, p. 756). This move strengthened the immigration–security nexus that projected strict visa requirements, cooperation in visa matters, deportation and readmission, and the imposition of carrier penalties to both regular and irregular immigrants indiscriminately (Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement [CISA], 1990). The Dublin Convention accompanied this Convention and specified the distribution of responsibilities for asylum seekers who had managed to enter the territory of a signatory member state. It essentially signified a shift from the universal responsibility to protect immigrants, enshrined in the Geneva Convention, to an emphasis on tightening border controls and reducing the number of entry options (Lavenex, 2001, p. 97). These highly relevant and important treaties underscore that even before 1992 the securitization of immigration, its discourses, policies and practices, was well underway.

In 1992, the Maastricht Treaty brought all immigration affairs into the regional jurisdiction of the newly established European Union and systematically securitized immigrants in two profound ways. First, it neglected to provide meaningful mechanisms for the ways in which immigration issues would be overseen at the judicial and supra-national levels. Second, it conflated immigration with matters pertaining to illegal migration, fraud, organized crime, terrorism and drug trafficking (Schlentz, 2010, p. 9). This is explicitly mentioned in Article K. 1 of Title VI of the Community Pillar, which lists immigration as a matter of “common concern” (Treaty on European Union, 1992). These concerns have also trickled into institutionalized immigration practices in both the Trevi and Schengen groups (Schlentz, 2010, p. 9).

Despite this, EU policymakers noticed yet another gap in how the Maastricht Treaty dealt with the single market and how intergovernmental cooperation handled immigration matters. The Amsterdam Treaty therefore followed in 1997 and de-linked immigration from questions of organized crime (Bigo, 2005, p. 74), while concurrently systematizing the immigration–security nexus through the Area of Freedom, Security and Freedom (AFSJ) “in which the free movement of persons is assured in conjunction with appropriate measures with respect to external border controls, asylum, immigration and the prevention and combatting of crime” (Treaty of Amsterdam, 1997). This move inadvertently strengthened the link between immigration and security concerns, giving the European Court of Justice (ECJ) greater jurisprudence on matters pertaining to Title IV of the Amsterdam Treaty (Geddes, 2008, p. 124). The securitization of immigration is therefore part of a larger security continuum that was introduced before Maastricht and actualized in the Amsterdam Treaty that systematically codified the immigration–security nexus in the AFSJ (Schlentz, 2010, p. 10). It is important to acknowledge the contents of each treaty because they constitute the foundation of contemporary EU identity, policies and practices. For example, although immigration issues were moved to the Community Pillar, usually only requiring majority voting, matters pertaining to the Schengen area are still incorporated into the legal framework of the EU, needing a unanimous decision at the European Council and a consultation procedure with the European Parliament. Moreover, member states are also given the opportunity to introduce proposals for new immigration issues, a right previously granted only to the European Commission. This enabled them to hold significant control over immigration policies (Schlentz, 2010, p. 10).

The Europeanization of immigration and the security logic that went with it, stemming from the treaties of Maastricht and Amsterdam, manifested itself in several border security practices that include the collection of personal data on TCNs. Although the focus of this paper is limited to 2006, these practices exist in the present day and continue to be expanded and developed to include the latest security technologies. The term “border security,” rather than border control, has become ubiquitous even before the 9/11 attacks with elite discourses and indirect speech acts creating a direct link between immigration and crime. EU immigration policies have engulfed the essence of this securitization discourse, thereby embodying the perception that border security is the only
mechanism of protecting EU citizens and reducing potential attacks on EU territory. It is important to note that this logic also lies at the centre of the EU counter-terrorism strategy. Enhancing border security is believed to hinge on avant-garde security technologies, principally those using biometric features in passports, visas, residence permits and identity documents, and the development and expansion of an EU-wide information system (Baldaccini, 2008, p. 32). However, biometric data on every TCN, temporary or otherwise, will not necessarily equate to a decline in criminal and terrorist activities. In fact, evidence thus far has proven that terrorists and transnational criminals almost always cross borders legally and use legitimate identification cards and passports in their host countries. The individuals that carried out the 9/11 attack on the World Trade Center, for instance, were equipped with either valid or expired US visas, and had valid residence permits or identification cards (Baldaccini, 2008, p. 33). The connection between criminality and/or terrorism and immigration is dubious; the ways in which the EU seeks to develop and enhance their border security is unsustainable, counter-productive and, most importantly, a clear reflection of the new racist discourse that perpetuates and facilitates the securitization of immigration.

The Schengen Information System (SIS), established under the 1990 Schengen Convention, is one example of EU efforts to develop and maintain border security. SIS started operating in 1995 and contains data on individuals wanted for “arrest or extradition, missing persons, stolen vehicles, firearms and other objects, and on third-country nations to be refused entry into the Schengen area” (Baldaccini, 2008, p. 37). Information stored in this database is also used to control the movement of persons at external borders. In a member state’s territory, or when issuing visas and resident permits. After much disagreement and negotiation between various EU member states, the final version of SIS, adopted by the Council of the European Union in 2000, spelled out the collection and processing of three types of biometric data: a) on asylum seekers, b) on aliens apprehended in connection with the irregular crossing of an external border and, c) on aliens found illegally present in a member state (Council of the European Union, 2003a). Because biometric data is very specific, it has the ability to link personal information to a particular individual. Biometric data can be used to confirm someone’s identity (one-to-one search) and to identify someone (one-to-many searches; Baldaccini, 2008, p. 37). This kind of technology transforms the nature of SIS from a mere database used for border security purposes to one that can, and often is, used to “fish” and create a suspect population from persons who make up the database. Such practices have serious implications on individuals wrongfully identified and convicted with criminal or terrorist activities, especially because authorities have the tendency to “overestimate the reliability of biometrics” (Baldaccini, 2008, p. 38). Although SIS had information on both immigrant and crime-related activities, it was primarily used to identify TCNs who should be denied entry into the Schengen area. At the beginning of 2007, SIS had data on 900,000 people, 750,000 of whom were TCNs reported for non-admission (Baldaccini, 2008, p. 39). The end of 2008 saw the establishment of SIS II, which used even better information technology to collect wider and newer categories of data on persons entering the Schengen area. New features of SIS II, particularly after September 11, included storing photographs and fingerprints of individuals as part of the EU counter-terrorism mechanism. Presently, the SIS is used by 27 states, three of whom (Iceland, Norway, and Switzerland) are not members of the EU. The prevalence of the securitization of immigration in the EU transforms the purpose of SIS and SIS II from a tool used for border control to one that investigates and reports crime and terrorism.

Part Three: The Significance of 9/11

Although the 9/11 attacks on the United States left an important legacy on the war on terror, it is important to note that the securitization of immigration, and its influence in policymaking and enforcement in the EU, existed before 2001. Immigration has historically been perceived as a potential economic, social, or security threat to the receiving society. As this paper has illustrated, the securitization discourse and the immigration–security nexus, which constitute a “new racism,” equates cultural difference with the disintegration of a homogenous society. For example, in 1975, the Trevi Group was established as an intergovernmental effort to curb internal security issues, including terrorism within member states. Authorities form the

Ministries of Home Affairs, the police, and internal security services of member states met twice a year to strategize ways to combat internal security threats. The Trevi had four working groups within it, and shared information and resources on terrorist activities, exchanged scientific and technological information on police work and training, and cooperated on civil aviation security, nuclear safety, and ways to handle natural disasters (Karyotis,
Immigration after the Second World War was considered necessary for the economic reconstruction of war-torn European economies. The success of ECSC was facilitated in part by the easy and free movement of coal and steel workers between signatory states. Nevertheless, developments after this period, including the 1970s oil crisis and its effects on global capitalism, the rise of neo-liberal policies and the decline of the welfare state, and the emergence of the EU’s single market, resulted in calls by EU political elites to strengthen the Union’s borders (Huysmans, 2006, p. 21). Bigo (2002) argues that the securitization of immigration replaced the communist threat in Europe with an alleged threat of the immigrant (p. 63). This, in turn, worked to secure the power of the state as the sole provider of security via strict immigration regulations and controls. The attacks of September 11, and those in Madrid and London, not only intensified the securitization of immigration, it also justified practices pertaining to the migration–security nexus in the EU (Togral, 2011, p. 225). The Visa Information System (VIS), for example, was established as a direct result of the 9/11 attacks. Ministers of the Home Affairs and Justice Council decided to tighten procedures of the issuance of visas and made recommendations for the Commissions to institute a network where member states can exchange information about the issue of visas (Baldaccini, 2008, p. 41). The VIS essentially collects and stores fingerprints and other biometric data of all TCNs applying for short-term visas in the Schengen area.

9/11 also linked immigration to terrorism; immigrants became a threat to both the culture and identity of the host state and to the lives of the populations in that territory. In effect, 9/11 dramatized “a publicly convenient link between international migration and security” (Karyotis, 2007, p. 2). EU rhetoric around immigrants after the attacks underscored policies of exclusion for non-European citizens and a “return to more restrictive immigration and asylum policies.” Before September 11, the EU worked towards the Europeanization of immigration, with the Commission asking the Council and the Parliament to reassess the “zero immigration” policy that had previously been in place. The Commission specifically stated: “channels for legal immigration to the Union should be made available to labor migrants” (European Commission, 2000). It also noted that the “declining and ageing populations in Europe,” and the racism and xenophobia primarily directed to immigrants could benefit from immigration because “while immigration will never be a solution itself to the problems of the labor market, migrants can make a positive contribution to the labor market, to economic growth and to the sustainability of social protection programs” (European Commission, 2000). After the attacks, the EU resorted to more restrictive and conservative immigration laws that altered existing policies on family reunification and the extension of long-term status to TCNs (Karyotis, 2007, p. 7). Furthermore, the Extraordinary Justice and Home Affairs Council meeting of September 20, 2001 encouraged the Commission to reappraise its previous policies on immigration and asylum seekers and, as a response, the Commission drafted a working paper on December 5, 2001 urging states to “scrupulously and rigorously” apply the exclusionary clauses contained in Article 1(F) of the Geneva Convention (European Commission, 2001). It also provided member states with the legal tools of rejecting entry to TCNs for reasons such as public policy or domestic security (Karyotis, 2007, p. 7). The working paper painted, explicitly and implicitly, immigrants as potential terrorists and threats to the national security of the state and the human security of its citizens.

There have been two prominent ways of framing immigration in Europe even before the 9/11 attacks. First, EU member states have been primarily concerned with the uncontrolled entry points into the region: the fear that there was an overwhelming sea of immigrants, either regular or irregular, who were “invading” European territory. Second, member states tend to focus on the social and economic impact of immigration, including the abuse of welfare and social services, and the fear that migrants will take jobs away from EU citizens. States have responded to this economic and social “threat” by tightening the criteria for visa applications, carrier sanctions and border controls, and curtailing overstay through detention and deportation (Boswell, 2007, p. 595). Indeed, while these measures were in place well before 9/11, it is important to note that the attacks on the World Trade Center exacerbated an already anti-immigration discourse and practice in the EU.
Conclusion

Indeed, the 9/11 terror attacks opened up a number of opportunities to link migration to terrorism, and systematically legitimated policies and practices to enhance migration control; however, they did not create the securitization discourse. Rather, the attacks exacerbated and reinforced a pre-existing rhetoric and narrative of the migration–security nexus. This securitization and “othering” of the migrant is a manifestation of a new form of cultural racism that perceives cultural differences at the ultimate threat to the social fabric of a particular community. Securitizing immigrants because they pose a “cultural” threat to the identity of the receiving state is inherently racist and discriminatory, and is a discourse constructed by policymakers and perpetuated by the media. Foundations of this discourse can be traced back to even before the Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties that strengthened the legal authority of the EU bodies on matters pertaining to immigration. The Dublin Convention and the SIS were then actual manifestations of this discourse that put it into legal practice with the use of various information technologies to collect biometric data on immigrants wanting entry into the Schengen area. 9/11 correlated the image of the migrant with two imminent “dangers:” as a threat to the cultural homogeneity and identity of the receiving country, and as a threat to the physical livelihood of its citizens. These attacks, and the subsequent attacks in Madrid, Berlin, and London, continue to further the securitization of immigration discourse and enhance already existing policies and practices that systematically excluded TCNs from entry, and identified them as threats to the security and stability of the region.

Indeed, Europe’s geopolitical location has left the region open to all kinds of security threats and concerns. However, sweeping and overarching policies and legislations that link immigration to terrorism, particularly after 9/11, and restrict immigration to populations that “look” suspicious is an unsustainable and an incredibly discriminatory way of securing the region’s borders. In effect, harsher, indiscriminate immigration and “counter-terrorism” policies only perpetuate the radicalization of both TCNs and EU citizens into participating in violent activities against the particular member state. The EU must therefore reassess their immigration policy to not only include ethical considerations and human rights of TCNs, but also to simultaneously establish a sustainable security agenda.

References


