The Notions of Self and Truth in Moral Perfectionism

Abstract

This essay discusses Stanley Cavell’s account of Emersonian moral perfectionism with a focus on the notion of self in Cavell’s characterizations of perfectionism. The question I address is how moral perfectionism would be best described, and what role the notion of the self plays in this connection.

Relatedly, I discuss the way in which Cavell contrasts Emersonian perfectionism with Iris Murdoch’s account of perfectionism which she illustrates with her famous example of M and D. Subsequent to problematizing Cavell’s account of perfectionism as a matter of moving from a self to a next one, and his way of distinguishing Emersonian perfectionism from Murdoch’s with reference to the notion of a changed self or a changed perception of oneself, I argue that essential to perfectionism is the the aspiration to comprehend what is true, and that it is impossible to make good sense of the perfectionist’s concern with the self, unless we take into account this concern with truth. Rather than concerned with the self as such, perfectionism is concerned with the self as a vehicle for grasping what is true.

This also explains how Cavell’s and Murdoch’s accounts of perfectionism can be understood as compatible after all, revealing an important similarity between Emerson’s perfectionist concern with truth and Murdoch’s account of objectivity in terms of the task of perfecting oneself. I conclude with remarks on how paying attention to the notion of truth likewise dissolves the worry that perfectionism might be elitist and incompatible with democracy. As I argue, perfectionism is not only consistent with but necessary for democracy.