Checks and balances dans le système parlementaire canadien

Abstract

This essay examines the informal application of the concept of checks and balances in Canada, drawing on the American model of separation of powers established in the 18th century to prevent any excessive concentration of authority. Although the separation of powers in Canada was explicitly institutionalized after the Second World War, and more particularly following the enactment of the Constitution Act of 1982, this essay argues that the Canadian system reflects—through constitutional conventions and the evolving role of the Supreme Court—an adaptation of American principles of mutual control among the executive, legislative, and judicial branches. The analysis is based on the evolution of judicial power in Canada, particularly with regard to constitutional review, as well as on the impact of the mediatization of politics, which creates new forms of checks and balances. By exploring these dynamics, the essay highlights the mechanisms through which Canada, despite lacking a formal system of checks and balances, succeeds in maintaining a balance of power and limiting authoritarian drift in a context where the branches of government operate in an interconnected manner.